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"WE DO NOT PREACH. WE TEACH." t
RELIGION PROFESSORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
By Leslie Griffin*
Consider some of the classes that a religion professor might
propose for the curriculum. A hypothetical Professor One, who is
Christian, focuses on Christian texts (primarily passages from the Old
Testament and the New Testament) because he wants to spread the
Good News. His students also read United States Supreme Court cases
about religion and Christian commentary that is critical of those cases
for their secular bias. At the end of each semester, the professor says,
"we have ranged far and wide here, and this has been a university
t Jacob Neusner, "Being Jewish" and Studying About Judaism, in JUDAIc
STuDms: AN ExERCISE IN THE HUMANITIES 1, 2 (David R. Blumenthal ed., 1977).
* Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University. Ph.D., Yale (Religious Studies);
J.D., Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Frank Reynolds, Kathleen Sullivan, Mark
Tushnet, Mike Seidman, Scott Altman, Ron Garet, Margaret Imber, David Cruz, Milner
Ball, Tom Grey, Steve Goldberg and Lisa Maurizio as well as to participants in the
Sawyer Seminar in Religion at the University of Chicago Divinity School and the
faculty of the University of Southern California Law School, for comments on the paper.
Julie Fabian and Michelle Regalia provided excellent research assistance. Research
support for this article was provided by Santa Clara University School of Law. I thank
Bob Drinan for his encouragement and for his unique insight on matters of church and
state.
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course, not a sermon, but everything in the course converges on the
conclusion that Jesus Christ is our Lord and Savior. That is the message
I hope you take away. Good luck on the exam."'
A very different Professor Two is fascinated by religious belief and
practice and does not believe in God. In his class, students learn some
basic historical background about Buddhism, Christianity, Daoism,
Hinduism, Judaism, Islam and the classical religions of Black Africa.
They compare these religions and explore whether there is "some
essence which is common to all religions."'
Meanwhile Professor Three invites numerous guest speakers into
his classroom. The visitors lecture about their religious beliefs. The
professor thinks that hearing the speakers will help the students to
understand the phenomenon of religion. The speakers often proclaim
their faith and personal beliefs in the classroom; the professor likes this
aspect of the course because he wants the students to understand the
strength of religious convictions. Professor Three presents speakers
representative of a range of religious convictions and strives to give
numerous religious views equal time (although he can never find
representatives of all the traditions taught by Professor Two).
Professor Four offers a course on the history of Christianity (which
is a huge topic) so he limits the course by focusing on Christology.
Students read passages from the New Testament, Arius and Athanasius,
some materials about the Council of Chalcedon, Anselm, Martin Luther
and John Calvin. To gain a sense of modem Christological disputes,
they also read Bultmann, Kdsemann, Moltmann, Pannenberg, Ralner
and Schillebeeckx. At the end of the semester, the professor
summarizes the course by telling students, "This semester, we have
covered a lot of material. I believe that I have demonstrated to you the
reasoning by which mainline Christians claim Jesus is the Christ." One
student asks: "Do you think Jesus is the only Savior, I mean, the one
Savior for all human beings, or just one important religious figure equal
to others like the Buddha?" The professor responds, "Within the
Christian tradition the predominant view is that Jesus Christ is the one
1. In one case, an exercise physiology professor said in class:
I personally believe God came to earth in the form of Jesus Christ and he has
something to tell us about life which is crucial to success and happiness. Now this
is simply my personal belief, understand, and I try to model my life after Christ,
who was concerned with people, and I feel that is the wisest thing I can do.
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11 th Cir. 1991). The court ruled that there was
no constitutional violation in a policy that restricted such speech by professors.
2. NINIAN SMART, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 11 (1998).
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and only Lord and Savior of all human beings. The equality view that
you mention is growing in popularity, but in my opinion the claim that
Jesus is the Lord is most representative of the history of Christianity."
These four courses also represent some of the options available to
the chairman of a hypothetical religion department. He could hire some
combination of Professors One, Two, Three and Four and assign them
to these classes. Another chairman's choice is suggested by Professor
Three. Why not transport the professor's "visitors" to the whole
department of religion, i.e., have a religion department composed of
individual believers representing different religious traditions? Claude
Welch once described such a department as "a museum or a zoo,
responsible for exhibiting all species of believers."3
This zoo is not a new idea.
After World War I, religion was at times taught by church
personnel who lived near state universities, not by professors in regular
academic departments. At the University of Illinois in 1919, for
example, "clergy representing the campus ministries of the Methodists,
Disciples, and Roman Catholics" petitioned to have "university credit
offered for courses taught at their campus houses., 4 "The 'Illinois Plan'
involve[d] the accreditation of courses in religion taught by approved
scholars in the various denominational centers surrounding the state
university campus."5 In the same era, the University of Iowa developed
a school of religion that "employed teachers of religion paid by the
different confessions (Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant)"; 6 these faculty
3. See Karl D. Hartzell, Review of the Discussions, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION ON
THE CAMPUS OF TODAY 50, 62 (Karl D. Hartzell & Harrison Sasscer eds., 1967).
4. GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 336 (1994).
5. Franklin H. Littell, Church, State, and University, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC
ORDER 78, 93 (Donald A. Giannella ed., 1963).
6. Id. at 92-93.
In the Iowa Plan, a school of religion is developed at, and finally in, the state
university, with competent teachers of religion paid by the different confessions
(Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant).... Most important, perhaps, it demonstrates to
the republic of learning as a whole the existence of a live dialogue between
believing Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. It is this point which has to be made, if
we are to move out of the shadow of a declining Protestant culture-religion without
falling into the trap of a militant and anti-humane secularism.
Id.; see also F. EARNEST JOHNSON, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS 75 (Robert Gordis et al.
eds., 1959).
It is not a 'nonsectarian' approach. Omnisectarian would be a more accurate term,
though the scope is necessarily limited. Definitive information about sectarian
beliefs and practices, under such a plan, would come, not from the school but from
authoritative spokesmen for their respective faiths whom students would question
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were believing Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. George Marsden
reports that "[t]he original purpose of the [Iowa] school was not simply
the academic study of religion. Rather the school was also explicitly to
promote religious interests, to foster sympathy for religion among
students, and to encourage students to go into religious vocations.'7
These off-campus denominational arrangements evolved in the
state universities because of the conviction that the presence of religion
departments in public institutions violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. If fostering religious life is the goal of courses in
religion, then public universities must avoid teaching religion for
constitutional reasons. Hiring off-campus personnel who do not have
regular academic appointments is supposed to solve the constitutional
problem.
Constitutional arguments have always influenced the teaching of
religion in American public universities. In his 1965 Study of Religion
in American Universities, Robert Michaelsen described the situation in
this way:
Religion studies faced special difficulties in the emerging state universities,
where often a strong liberal arts or classical humanistic tradition had never
existed and where constitutional limitations appeared to restrict what could be
done in this area. Theology rarely received formal academic attention in these
institutions, and such areas as church history, history of religions, and Biblical
studies were commonly neglected or grossly underdeveloped. A few state
universities-such as Michigan and California-did develop significant work
in areas related to the study of religion such as anthropology and Near Eastern
studies, but most of the state schools contributed little to the advancement of
scholarship in religion. At the same time efforts were made to provide studies
in religion in some state universities through some type of extra-university
structure. Denominational groups founded 'Bible chairs' or set up some other
type of device whereby students could take courses which were accredited
either directly by the university or through some kind of transfer procedure.
when they visit churches and synagogues just as they visit the markets, industries,
and welfare agencies.
Id.
7. MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 336 (emphasis added).
8. See generally MERR1MON CUNINGGIM, THE COLLEGE SEEKS RELIGION 83
(1947).
At any rate, it will later be made clear that during this century the religious life of
the tax-supported institutions has largely been expressed through the work of
voluntary organizations, and much of the interest which administrators have
expressed has consisted solely of moral support for the work of these unofficial
agencies.
QLR
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Such courses were almost always taught by instructors who did not have
faculty status in the university and were offered in an off-campus setting.
Independent schools of religion were established at some universities in order
that students could study this area which was not available to them in the
university. Such extra-university structures were often represented as offering
a legitimate solution to problems stemming from the American tradition of
separation of church and state.9
9. ROBERT MICHAELSEN, THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 2-3
(1965); see also CUNINGGIM, supra note 8, at 79.
In 1947, Cuninggim had acknowledged that the "tax-supported institution"
"pose[s] a special problem." Id. at 83. Cuninggim knew, as did Michaelsen, that
religion had always been taught in American colleges. Nonetheless, "[t]he bogey of the
separation of church and state plagued the college officials." Id. at 124. Some people
argued that "the presence of religion in any form in a state institution is both illegal and
inappropriate." Cuninggim described John Dewey and Alvin W. Johnson as advocates
of keeping religion out of schools due to separation of church and state; Cuninggim
thought that their argument was mistaken. See id. at 79. Cuninggim argued for a
greater role for religion:
It is often considered that the principle of the separation of church and state
prevents their manifesting any strong religious interest and assuming any real
responsibility for the religious life of their students .... Suffice it to say now that
the necessity for their neutrality on the subject of religion is at least debatable.
MICHAELSEN, supra, at 129.
[T]here does not exist any nation-wide legal or constitutional principle which
prevents such institutions from including religion in their programs if they so
desire. Their own state laws or court interpretations may raise difficulties, but
these occur in only a small minority of the states, and there is no state in which
nothing at all can be done.
Id.
Many writers shared Cuninggim's view that separation of church and state did
not preclude religion courses in state universities; this opinion grew more popular as
departments of religion expanded in the 1950s and 1960s. See David W. Louisell &
John H. Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50 CAL. L. REV.
751, 753 n.3 (1962). In 1962, Louisell and Jackson had concluded "that neither the
constitutions nor laws of the United States or California prevent the nondiscriminatory
establishment of religion and theology courses in state supported institutions of higher
education." Id. Further, in the context of legal norms, questions about the legality of
courses such as typical ones in comparative religion or religion courses essentially
historical, descriptive, or literary, seem insubstantial to the point of being frivolous;
whereas more real questions may be presented respecting certain courses in theology.
Others continued to argue that the First Amendment did not allow any religion
professors in the state universities. See, e.g., CLYDE A. HOLBROOK, RELIGION, A
HUMANISTIC FIELD 169 (1963). Some writers even thought that giving university credit
for the denominational courses violated church-state separation. See, e.g., Erich A.
Walter, Introduction, in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 1 (Erich A. Walter ed.,
1958). Yet others thought that that compromise was
perfectly appropriate to the general nature and circumstances of the state university
itself, and typical of it.... On the one hand, there is the principle of separation of
HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 5 2000
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A more surprising development in American universities is that the
First Amendment's influence has not been restricted to public
universities and state university professors of religion. In the United
States, the constitutional debates about public universities and religion
in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with an extensive academic dispute
among private university religion professors about what they should
teach. Many of these professors argued, e.g., that Professors One, Three
and Four do not meet the academic standards of the profession. These
scholars challenged the academic rigor of professors who were
committed to religious beliefs and the academic merit of courses that
include normative arguments about religious traditions. The
terminology was important in the academic conflict: the scholars
distinguished the traditional field of theology from the newer religious
studies. The committed and normative study of religion was identified
as theology. The paradigmatic religious studies professor was an
outsider whose scholarship was descriptive and comparative.
In the public schools, committed religious professors and
normative religious courses were also viewed with suspicion: they
posed the threat of the establishment of religion. The constitutional and
academic debates converged. Eventually, the religion professors-both
public and private-looked to the Supreme Court to resolve the
controversy. The scholars decided that the Court settled the
constitutional question in a 1963 school prayer case, Abington School
District v. Schempp,'° when the Court stated (in dicta) that "teachers
may teach about but not of religion in the public schools."" From
Schempp the scholars concluded that the First Amendment prohibits the
teaching of theology but permits religious studies in state universities.
In fact, the Court has never addressed the constitutional status of
church and state. On the other, there is the fact that religion is inseparable from
large areas of human thought and feeling and thus from higher learning.
Walton E. Bean, What Is the State University?, in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY
58 (Erich A. Walter ed., 1958).
The commentators noticed the difference between universities and elementary
schools. See HOLBROOK, supra, at 171 ("Apparently publicly supported universities
have not been content to divorce religion as an academic subject from higher education
with the same decisiveness with which the American people have insisted upon its
omission in the public schools at lower levels."); Louisell & Jackson, supra, at 766
("Theological courses at the college level, however, with purely voluntary participation,
conducted on an intellectual level compatible with the norms of higher education and
accordant with the historical liberal arts tradition, present a problem wholly different
from that of McCollum.").
10. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11. Id. at 306.
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theology or religious studies. In time, religious studies became the
preferred academic discipline in both private and public universities as
theology declined in influence.
In this essay, I examine the interaction of academic and
constitutional arguments about teaching religion. In the last thirty-six
years, both lawyers and scholars in religion have been puzzled by the
constitutional and the academic dimensions of this subject. I conclude
that, although the two groups were discussing the same subject, the
conversations did not influence each other in any meaningful way.
While the religion professors were misinterpreting the Supreme Court
cases, the justices were ignoring the profession's insights about the
place of religion in the schools. This disjunction left the scholars with
an inadequate professional standard and the Court with a deficient
constitutional test.
In Part One, I explain that the academics have chosen a subject
matter standard according to which the teaching of religious studies, but
not theology, is constitutional in state universities. The Supreme
Court's statements on teaching religion are dicta from Schempp
(recognizing "the propriety.., of the teaching about religion, as
distinguished from the teaching of religion, in the public schools").' 2
Nonetheless American scholars of religion relied on the dicta and linked
the identity of their discipline to statements of the Supreme Court.3
About/of was never the Court's standard; therefore in Part Two, I
identify the actual legal standard of the Supreme Court's First
Amendment cases on religion in the schools. The Court has frequently
ruled about the place of religion in the schools; in these cases, however,
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. See ROBERT F. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 223-24
(1963).
The spirit and wording of the Zorach opinion is an example of the enormous
influence which a Supreme Court opinion can exert. In an excellent study entitled
Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, Professor Frank J.
Sorauf writes: "This impact of Zorach beyond the bounds of the facts it decided
and the rules it enunciated illustrates how Supreme Court precedents, as soon as
they leave judicial hands, enter into another realm of policy-making and become
symbols in political debate and deliberation." Professor Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr.,
in an article on the School Prayer case in the November, 1962, issue of the
Harvard Law Review, comments in the same vein when he notes: "Some of the
more startling connotations of the School Prayer opinions may come to be
explained as springing from obiter dicta, unnecessary to the actual decision." But
church-state cases have seemed to attribute unusual authority to dicta; even by-the-
way judicial remarks about religion in schools are not readily brushed off.
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distinctions about the study of religion do not determine the outcome of
the case. Unlike the scholars, the justices have often promoted an
institutional principle that ignores the content of the courses and focuses
on the (religious or public) nature of the schools.
In the 1980s, both the religious studies subject matter standard and
the justices' institutional principle came under attack from theologians,
theists and jurists. The criticisms of the academy and the Court are
described in Part Three. The Court has responded to some of these
criticisms. In Part Four, I argue that the constitutional standard has
changed. New dicta in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University
of Virginia 4 (suggesting that the line between "religious speech" and
"speech about religion" is too hard to draw) have replaced the Schempp
dicta. Moreover, the institutional principle was compromised in 1997 in
Agostini v. Felton.5
In contrast to the Court, the religion professors have not yet
revisited their constitutional or academic standards. In Part Five, I
argue that the religion professors misinterpreted Schempp; teaching
theology is constitutional. The religion professors should not have
equated about/of with religious studies/theology. Today the
Rosenberger dicta suggest that the line between instruction and
evangelism cannot hold. That argument challenges the premises of the
academic discipline of religious studies; the scholars have not yet
responded.
"When instruction turns to proselyting and imparting knowledge
becomes evangelism is, except in the crudest cases, a subtle inquiry.' '
Such subtlety is the daily fare of religious studies; the professional
standard requires that religion professors impart knowledge but not
proselytize. In my conclusion I urge the religion professors not to
repeat their constitutional errors. They should reject the Court's dicta in
Rosenberger, namely Justice Kennedy's decision to fund evangelism
because the line between "religious speech" and "speech about religion"
is uncertain. Along with Justice Souter, the professors know that
evangelism is a "core religious activity" that is distinguishable from the
14. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
15. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
16. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Harry N. Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public
Schools, 22 U. PITr. L. REv. 561, 579 (1961) ("While the line of separation is not
always easy to draw, imparting secular knowledge is legal while sectarian
proselytization is not: the Constitution permits secular instruction in the public schools
but not religious evangelism.").
QLR
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"discourse of the scholar's study or the seminar room."' 7 Under the
professors' constitutional standard, the funding of evangelism in any
location is prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
I. THE RELIGION PROFESSORS' CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD:
RELIGIOUS STUDIES OR THEOLOGY
In his seminal 1971 study, Graduate Education in Religion, Claude
Welch stated that the legal status of the academic study of religion in
state universities was settled in the 1963 Schempp case." Welch is
representative of religion scholars, who after Schempp identified the
difference between teaching about religion and teaching of religion as
the constitutional standard. Teaching about religion in the state
university is constitutional; teaching of religion is unconstitutional.
When it barred prayer from the public elementary school classroom, the
Supreme Court stated (in dicta of course) that public schools may offer
religion as part of their curriculum. The Court mentioned that the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit the "study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education."'9 The Court noted that "one's education is not complete
without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its
relationship to the advancement of civilization. 2 °  The influential
distinction came from Justice Goldberg's concurrence, which
"recognize[d] the propriety... of the teaching about religion, as
distinguished from the teaching of religion, in the public schools.'
For scholars in religion, Schempp settled what had been until then
an open question and established the constitutionality of teaching
religious studies, but not theology, in state universities. To these
scholars, religious studies is teaching about religion; theology is
teaching of religion.
What is religious studies? It is the name often used in the United
States for the academic study of religion, a term used to distinguish such
study from the more traditional theology. The title is somewhat
17. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868.
18. CLAUDE WELCH, GRADUATE EDUCATION IN RELIGION vii (1971).
19. Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 306.
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confusing because "the activity itself is not religious. 22 For centuries in
the Christian world, the study of religion was theology; theology was
the core of the medieval university, the queen of the sciences. Theology
was an intellectual discipline because it included a quest for knowledge;
in its classic formulation, it was "faith seeking understanding."
Although rooted in faith, theology was properly located, not in the
church, but in the university. "It was the university, not the Church, that
fostered the new understanding of theologia as scientia, a scholarly
'discipline' that demonstrated its conclusions."23  "Sacra doctrina is a
discipline, sufficiently parallel to physics and metaphysics to be a
science. 2 4 All religions do not have theologies. Due to Christianity's
influence on American and European universities, however, theology
has become a generic term for a study of religion that includes some
type of commitment, usually to a particular religious tradition.
In Europe in the nineteenth century, however, the scientific study
of religion emerged to challenge theology's reign.2 ' This science is a
22. The "study of religion(s)" is "a more accurate description than 'religious
studies' since the activity itself is not religious." Study of Religion(s), in A NEW
DICTIONARY OF RELIGIONS 498, 499 (John R. Hinnells ed., 1995).
23. Joseph M. Kitagawa, The History of Religions (Religionswissenschaft) Then
and Now, in THE HISTORY OFRELIGIONS 121, 126 (Joseph M. Kitagawa ed., 1985).
Theology along with law and liberal arts could occupy a legitimate place, in fact,
the reigning place, in... the university. Thus it would have a method of its own,
hence method itself could be thematized and become the occasion of controversy.
Sacra doctrina is a discipline, sufficiently parallel to physics and metaphysics to
be a science. As such it had founding principles and it proceeded to connect the
principles with conclusions.
Id. (quoting EDWARD FARLEY, THEOLOGIA: THE FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY OF
THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION 38 (1983)).
24. EDWARD FARLEY, THEOLOGIA: THE FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY OF
THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION 38 (1983).
25. See The Study of Religion, in THE HARPER COLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION
909 (Jonathan Z. Smith ed., 1995) ("The study of religion in a nontheological, academic
setting is a modem phenomenon.").
In a very important sense, however, the study of religion(s), as a distinctive
intellectual, academic attitude towards the study of the world's religions, is a very
modem practice which did not exist until after the European, specifically German,
Enlightenment. Religion ... came to be seen as a part of human history and
cultural development and an object of study, rather than as the subject of the way
life should be ordered.
Joseph M. Kitagawa, The History of Religions in America, in THE HISTORY OF
RELIGIONS: ESSAYS IN METHODOLOGY 1, 17-18 (Mircea Eliade & Joseph M. Kitagawa
eds., 1959).
In retrospect it becomes evident that the scientific study of religions was a product
of the Enlightenment. In the study of religion the Enlightenment period accepted
the deistic notion of reason and rejected the authority of revelation. The
QLR
HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 10 2000
2000] RELIGION PROFESSORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11
"child of the Enlightenment,, 26 particularly the German Enlightenment,
which contributed to "the separation of theology from religion. 27 In
1870 Friedrich Max Mfiller's lectures at the Royal Institute of London
proposed a "science of religion." MUller might not have been the first
to use the term, but his influence on the developing field was profound.28
Religionswissenschaft became a technical term for the study of religion,
a study different in method and perspective from Christian theology.29
The beginnings of Religionswissenschaft were difficult; the
"modem discipline developed rather haphazardly out of more traditional
ways of studying religion and religions."30  Many of the scholars
committed to the new enterprise of religion had themselves been trained
in Christian theology, in denominational and seminary settings."
Enlightenment thinkers also accepted the concept of religio naturalis or a universal
religiosity underlying all historic religions which was to be perceived by reason
without the aid of revelation.
Id.
26. WiNNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA: RELIGIOUS
DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1994) ("The academic
study of religion in the West, along with the other social sciences is a child of the
Enlightenment."); see also Study of Religion(s), supra note 22, at 499; Kitagawa, supra
note 23, at 128 ("child of the Enlightenment").
27. Kitagawa, supra note 23, at 127.
28. See id. Miuller's lectures were later published as the Introduction to the Science
of Religion. M0ller
is one of the most prominent of those figures to whom the history of the study of
religion refers when giving an account of its genesis and history.... He must be
regarded as one of the chief founders-as well as one of the most prominent
sustaining patrons-of the new science of the study of religion.
WALTER H. CAPPS, RELIGIOUS STUDIES: THE MAKING OF A DISCIPLINE 68 (1995).
Kitagawa says that "Henry Benjamin Constant (1767-1830) is usually credited
with having produced the first 'scientific' study of religions." Kitagawa, supra note 23,
at 128; see also MORRIS JASTROW JR., THE STUDY OF RELIGION 43 (1901) ("Foremost
among these, by virtue of his works as well as by virtue of his services as a pioneer,
stands the late Professor F. Max Miller, of Oxford.").
29. See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE QUEST: HISTORY AND MEANING IN RELIGION 1 (1969)
("Since Religionswissenschaft is not easily translatable into English, we are obliged to
use 'history of religions' in the broadest sense of the term, including not only history
properly speaking but also the comparative study of religions and religious morphology
and phenomenology."); Religionswissenschaft, in A NEW DICTIONARY OF RELIGIONS 416
(John R. Hinnells ed., 1995).
30. Study of Religion(s), supra note 22, at 499.
31. See generally Religionswissenschaft, supra note 29, at 416-17.
The division of labour is difficult to maintain because the study of Christianity in
Europe has for a long time been-and still is-the exclusive domain of
theologians, and theologians have also been working in the field of
Religionswissenschaft. In consequence, the methodology used in both disciplines
is not questioned as such, so that theology and Religionswissenschaft are separated
HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 11 2000
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Accordingly they might be unable to change or challenge their
theological presuppositions. Scholars trained in theology outnumbered
the new scientists for many years. Joseph Kitagawa has demonstrated
that
this early history of religions did not win its independence easily. On the one
hand, religiously committed Europeans did not readily accept an alternative
method in the study of religion which compared Jewish and Christian
traditions with other religions of the world on the same plane. Furthermore,
the teaching of Religionswissenschaft was often done in the theological
faculties of universities, faculties not inclined to trust the new discipline and
its rationalistic and/or evolutionary thrust. On the other hand, those who were
"scientifically oriented" suspected hidden religious or theological agendas
32behind what claimed to be an objective approach.
The new scientists pressed on despite these difficulties. By 1899,
Cornelis P. Tiele33 described Muller's work as "more an apologetics for
the young discipline of Religionswissenschaft than an introduction to the
discipline itself."3 Nonetheless, Tiele argued that the discipline had
developed in the years since Muller began his work.35  Scholars had
begun to identify the distinctive methods that characterize the study of
religion.
A new discipline might require a different institutional setting as
well as a new method.36 University of Chicago Professor Jonathan Z.
more by their fields of research than by their respective methodologies, and the
theoretical distinction in work seems obsolete to many academics outside the field.
Id.
32. Joseph M. Kitagawa, Introduction, in THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT xii (Joseph M. Kitagawa ed., 1985).
33. See JASTROW JR., supra note 28, at 47 ("The most distinguished representative
of the subject at the Dutch universities is Professor C. P. Tiele, whose contributions to
the elucidation of the religious history of mankind have secured for him the place of
honour by the side of Max MUller.").
34. Kitagawa, supra note 23, at 121.
35. See id.; see also CAPPS, supra note 28, at 69.
Miller's remarks indicate that he did not assume that the history of religions was
to be classified as a separate field or discipline. History of religions-he called it
"science of religion"-had no developed conscious sense of its range, capacities,
and ongoing tradition. In fact, a tradition had not as yet been formed. The makeup
of the subject-field was still fluid, and its capacities were embryonic and, thus,
untested.
Id.
36. See The Study of Religion, supra note 25, at 915.
One consequence of this approach to the study of religion was that it gave scholars
a reason for the creation of departments of religion as independent disciplines in
QLR
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Smith reports that, in 1877, in Holland, "[flor the first time in western
academic history, there were established two, parallel possibilities for
the study of religion: a humanistic mode within the secular academy and
a theological course of study within the denominational seminary."37
Until then, the seminary had been the proper center for the study of
religion (i.e., Christianity). With the institutional move from seminary
to university came changes in the study of religion; the demands of the
"secular academy" were different from those of the "denominational
seminary."
Professor Smith explains that the United States did not
immediately pursue the pathway taken by Holland in the 1870s. Instead
it followed a "sequential pattern";38 divinity degrees were usually
prerequisites to doctoral degrees in religious studies. According to
Professor Smith, however, it was not until Schempp that American
public universities followed the "parallel" pattern of Holland and other
European countries and that religious studies flourished.
The preeminence of religious studies in American universities was
new in the 1960s, but the study of religion was not new, even in state
colleges and universities. If religion needs its own methodology, it can join other
academic disciplines that have specific methods for inquiring into subjects not
reducible to other departments.
Id.
37. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN 103
(1982); see also JASTROW JR., supra note 28, at 47.
To Holland belongs the distinction of having been the first country to make
adequate provision for the study of the subject in her higher schools. A decree was
passed in 1876, by which the theological faculties of the four Dutch universities-
Leiden, Amsterdam, Utrecht, and Groningen-were changed from mere training
schools for ministers of a certain denomination into purely scientific bodies of the
same order as the philosophical, law, and medical faculties. All the subjects
represented-Old and New Testament, Church History, Dogmatics-were
henceforth to be taught as purely historical disciplines and from a purely scientific
point of view, the specific training for the service of the Church being left to
supplemental courses provided for by each denomination, or relegated to non-
official separate seminaries. At the same time the important step was taken of
adding to each of the four faculties a chair for the general and comparative History
of Religions.
Id.
38. SMITH, supra note 37, at 103; see also James M. Gustafson, The Study of
Religion in Colleges and Universities: A Practical Commentary, in THE STUDY OF
RELIGION IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 330, 338 (Paul Ramsey & John F. Wilson
eds., 1970). Princeton University Department of Religion took the lead in "conceiv[ing]
of graduate studies in religion in such a way that the necessity for (or expectation of) an
intermediate professional degree could be eliminated." Id.
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schools.39 As Merrimon Cuninggim reported in his 1947 book The
College Seeks Religion: "Religion has always been present in the
colleges of America.... Prior to the [twentieth] century the intimacy of
this relationship was inevitably subject to ebb as well as flow. '4° After
all, early American universities were founded and staffed by Protestant
clergy; one of their functions was to train ministers by teaching them
theology.4' The earliest state universities shared many similarities with
the Christian universities, e.g., in trying to produce "Christian
gentlemen.4 2 Such religious and moral purposes in education help to
explain why theology was often characterized as an integrating subject.
If education's goal is the formation of Christian gentlemen, then
theology may be the core study that integrates all learning, that links
education to morality.
Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century (indeed to
the present day), the integrative possibility of religious/theological
education is a recurring theme in American education. Professor
Michaelsen explains, however, that in the second half of the nineteenth
century the "curriculum of Christian humanism went into decline" when
American university presidents adopted the German model of
specialization. As the German model grew in influence, "theology,
which had been considered important enough to be of interest to all
students in the early American colleges, became a minor enterprise of
little or no importance in the majority of developing American
universities.4 3 The churches developed their own universities; theology
moved to the seminaries and denominational schools. Although
German universities had faculties of theology, "most American
universities developed in an intellectual atmosphere which was quite
hostile to theology."4  As agricultural schools and other state
universities, including the land grant colleges, developed, they followed
39. MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 156 ("Obviously religion is being studied in
American universities, including state universities.").
40. CUNINGGtM, supra note 8, at 1.
41. See Littell, supra note 5, at 81 ("Theological education" was a "moving force
in the foundations" of these universities.).
42. See id. ("Even during the nineteenth century, when the churches were perforce
shifting to a basis of voluntary membership and support, the earlier tradition that we
were a Christian people carried over at law and was expressed in the public liturgy and
in the public schools and state universities.").
43. MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 1.
44. Id.
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many of the patterns set by the private schools. "There was one sharp
difference: they had no theological faculties. 45
As theology declined in influence in the late nineteenth century,
some short-lived attempts were made in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to establish the scientific study of religion in
American universities. Professor Michaelsen describes the years
between 1890 and 1910 as "the 'golden age' of American scholarship in
religion. 46  Important history of religion chairs were established at
Harvard and at Boston University in the nineteenth century. At the
University of Pennsylvania, Morris Jastrow, influenced by his training
in Europe, led the scientific movement with The Study of Religion.
Jastrow advocated the scientific study of religion and worked to
establish it as a rigorous discipline at Penn. He warned that students
would expect their religion courses to provide meaning to their lives,
perhaps to fulfill an integrative function in their education. Questions
about religion's integrative role (as the field that provides, e.g., the
moral center or focus for all education) have been present in curricular
debates since the founding of American universities; they continue to
confound us in the 1990s.4 8 Jastrow urged scholars of religion to pursue
their study as a science:
45. Littell, supra note 5, at 82.
46. MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 2; see also Kitagawa, supra note 32, at xii.
In comparison with Europe, nineteenth-century North America was more
hospitable to the historical study of religions ("history of religions" in a primarily
historical sense) and the comparative study of religions, but not to the more fully
developed discipline of the history of religions (Religionswissenschaft), which was
yet to be introduced. Humanistically oriented historical study was exemplified by
the establishment of the prestigious "American Lectures on the History of
Religions" in 1891, while comparative study, which was more religiously
motivated, was dramatically symbolized by the World's Parliament of Religions
held in Chicago in 1893.
Kitagawa, supra note 25, at 2.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, interest in religions of the
world became rather widespread in America. Philosophers, theologians,
philologists, historians, and ethnologists began to be fascinated by the so-called
comparative approach. In the year 1867, James Freeman Clarke was called to the
chair of natural religion and Christian doctrine in the Harvard Divinity School....
In 1873 Boston University invited William Fairfield Warren, author of The Quest
of Perfect Religion, to become its first professor of comparative theology and of
the history and philosophy of religion.
Id.
47. See JASTROW JR., supra note 28.
48. See, e.g., MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 336.
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There is a special reason for emphasizing the importance of method in the
study of the various religious systems of the past and present, and of religious
phenomena in general. In the study of religion, a factor that may be
designated as the personal equation enters into play. So strong is this factor
that it is perhaps impossible to eliminate it altogether, but it is possible, and
indeed essential, to keep it in check and under safe control; and this can be
done only by the determination of a proper method and by a close adherence
to such a method.49
Scholars of religion have spent the last century trying to identify
and clarify this method. In the scientific study of religion, the subject
matter is obviously religion. However, there are numerous disciplines
that examine religion: history, sociology, anthropology, psychology,
philosophy, linguistics, philology (as well as traditional theology). All
are fields that are valuable to the study of religion. Once theologians
are no longer the scholars best equipped to study religion, these
practitioners of other disciplines are well qualified to offer "scientific"
analyses of religion. Anthropologists, after all, study the anthropology
of religion; sociologists focus on the sociology of religion. What insight
can religion scholars offer to trained anthropologists, sociologists or
philosophers? Scholars of religion have desired to build a science with
its own method around the study of religion, but the nature of the
science is not obvious. Is the study of religion a distinct subject that
needs a separate department, a separate method? °  With the
49. JASTROW JR., supra note 28, at 1 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., David W. Atkinson, Religious Studies: In Search of a Paradigm, 11
REL. STuD. & THEO. 10, 10 (1992); Elizabeth Isichei, Some Ambiguities in the Academic
Study of Religion, 23 RELIGION 379, 379 (1993) ("Few questions are more in need of
reflection and discussion than this: is Religious Studies a discipline with a distinctive
methodology and intellectual heritage, or is it multidisciplinary, like American Studies,
or Women's Studies? It seems to me self evident that it is the latter ... ").
A peculiarity of Religious Studies departments is how faculty in such departments
often do not graduate from programs by that name. One commonly finds
philosophers, anthropologists, theologians, sociologists, and the like attaching
themselves to Departments of Religious Studies, as if they can pull on a new set of
clothes over those they are already wearing. Under such circumstances, an
ongoing challenge for Religious Studies is the difficult matter of self definition,
and how Religious Studies is to be distinguished from other disciplines that focus
on religion. A number of commentators have suggested that the continuation of
Religious Studies as an academic discipline requires "more than a polite
acknowledgement of its 'polymethodic' nature."
Atkinson, supra, at 10.
One of the problems in discussing the study of religions, especially as it applies to
academic study, is that it involves a number of different disciplines or methods.
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"abandonment" of theology, why not offer the history of religion, the
sociology of religion, the philosophy of religion, the anthropology of
religion, in courses taught by professors trained in those disciplines?
Perhaps a religion department should include scholars trained in
disciplines other than religion instead of a group of scientific students of
religion in a distinctive discipline with its own method. (Neither of
these options, of course, permits the visitors of Professor Three.)
By the end of World War I, Jastrow's model of scientific American
departments of religion had faded as theology returned.
After World War I, a self-conscious and largely successful effort was made to
bend efforts on behalf of religion in American academia toward providing a
theological ideology of higher education. Graduate training in religion largely
passed from departments (like Jastrow's), teaching the philologies and
histories of the several religions impartially, to the theological seminaries,
both Christian and Jewish, where existential and neo-orthodox theology
51dominated the scene.
Remember that it was in the post-World War I era that the
denominational and Bible chairs system flourished. The integrative
function of religious education was prominent. The public universities
faced a special problem: if fostering religious life is the goal of courses
in religion, then public universities might have to avoid religion for
constitutional reasons. The Iowa, Illinois and comparable plans existed
because state departments of religion were presumed unconstitutional.
The 1930s were a low point in American religious studies; the era
favored theology and not religion. 52 "Th[e] tendency favorable to the
The overall study has been described as polymethodic. There is some question as
to whether the study of religion(s) can be referred to as a discipline at all.
Murray G. Murphey, On the Scientific Study of Religion in the United States 1870-1980,
in RELIGION AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 136 (Michael J.
Lacey ed., 1989); see also Study of Religion(s), supra note 22, at 500; Michel Meslin,
From the History of Religions to Religious Anthropology: A Necessary Reappraisal, in
THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 31 (Joseph M. Kitagawa ed., 1985); Ninian Smart, Religious
Studies and Theology, 26 BULLETIN/CSSR 66, 67 (Sept. 1997) ("Religious Studies is
multidisciplinary, or as I prefer to say 'polymethodic' (in the early days of the Lancaster
Department, Britain's first Department of Religious Studies, we used to say that we
polymethodoodled all the day).").
51. See William A. Clebsch & Charles H. Long, Introduction, in THE STUDY OF
RELIGION 1, 13 (William A. Clebsch & Charles H. Long eds., 1981) (emphasis added).
52. See Kitagawa, supra note 32, at xii.
The popularity of historical and comparative studies of religions was enhanced by
liberalism during the first quarter of the century, but it eroded quickly in the 1930s.
Historical, comparative, and humanistic studies of religions in North America
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history of religions and comparative religion has been reversed since the
middle of the 1930's, partly under the influence of the theological
renaissance and partly because of the change which has taken place in
cultural and educational domains."53 There were also practical reasons
for the decline in religion study. For example, the scholars were not yet
equipped to advance the scientific study of religion; there were not
enough graduate students trained in the history of religions available to
teach at either private or public universities.54
After World War II, however, the "scientific-scholarly approach
staged a gradual, by no means yet universal, comeback."" Such
growing interest in the study of religion did not settle the theology vs.
scientific study debate. Cuninggim, for example, warned in 1947 of
"the low intellectual level characteristic of much of the religious
instruction now being offered, and the consequent lack of respect in
which religion as a subject of study is often held by the rest of the
college. 56 "Courses in religion, as any experienced observer knows, are
often 'snaps' or 'crips'";" this must change. Nonetheless Cuninggim
argued that the goal of the courses was not only intellectual; the study of
religion should integrate the curriculum and should nurture students'
religious lives. He noted with approval that "the secularization of
higher education seems to have reached its peak around the time of the
first World War, and that since then the colleges have recaptured much
of their lost concern for the religious development of their students and
have increasingly assumed responsibility for such nurture." 8
barely survived. Where they survived, they did so mainly in private graduate




55. Clebsch & Long, supra note 51, at 13; see also MARSDEN, supra note 4, at
336-37.
Despite some such successes, the school of religion idea began to recede during the
1930s.... [Tihe very success of the campaign to promote the academic study of
religion was making sponsorship by outside religious groups superfluous.
Increasing numbers of colleges and universities were now offering courses in
religion and establishing their own departments of religion. When university
administrators were responsive, as they often were, to demands for offerings in
religion, it was in their interest to offer such courses within the university as
scientific or literary studies, rather than have them administered by denominations
whose primary purpose was to promote a religious cause.
Id.
56. CUNINGGIM, supra note 8, at 148-49.
57. Id. at 149.
58. Id. at 1.
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As American higher education expanded after World War II, the
study of religion prospered with it.59 In the 1940s, there were numerous
American departments of religion; "[o]nly 27 percent of nationally
accredited colleges had no formal offerings on religious topics.' '6 "By
1950 some 60 percent of state universities and land grant colleges were
offering courses in religion, and during the next decades the field
continued to grow.",6' Departments of religion burgeoned in importance
and quality in many schools in the 1940s and 1950s.62 In 1965, Robert
Michaelsen reported that "it appears that American universities have
been giving more serious attention to the study of religion in the past
two decades than they had since early in the century. And in the case of
state universities the recent interest in this area is unparalleled in
American history.63  Yet the schools continued to vary in type and
quality of course offerings.
The particular arrangements vary widely from institution to institution. In
some institutions the courses are listed in the regular catalogue and taught in
University classrooms; and in others they are listed in separate bulletins and
taught in private facilities. In some instances, credit is granted in the regular
manner and in others credit is treated on a transfer basis. In some cases the
program serves in effect as a Department of Religion.64
59. See id. at 86 ("Since about 1930 there has occurred a tremendous increase of
interest in religion on the part of tax-supported colleges and universities.").
60. MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 337.
61. Id. at 414.
62. See MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 3; John F. Wilson, Introduction: The
Background and Present Context of the Study of Religion in Colleges and Universities,
in THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 3, 6-7 (Paul Ramsey & John
F. Wilson eds., 1970) (explaining that growth in religion started after the Second World
War and was not brought on only by Schempp). See generally MILTON D. MCLEAN &
HARRY H. KIMBER, TEACHING OF RELIGION IN STATE UNIVERSITIES: DESCRIPTIONS OF
PROGRAMS IN TWENTY-FIVE INSTITUTIONS 3 (1960).
63. MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 3 (emphasis added). But see HOLBROOK, supra
note 9, at 62-63.
Whereas sectarianism and secularism seemed to have effectively closed the doors
to any substantial advance in making religion a part of a liberal education in the
early part of the twentieth century, the much heralded impact of the "moral and
spiritual crisis" had its effect on higher education .... [T]he crisis alerted some
educators to the unacceptability of an education which failed to deal trenchantly
and convincingly with the foundations of human values .... What the churches had
not done, the introduction of religion into the curriculum could not be expected to
accomplish.
Id.
64. MCLEAN & KIMBER, supra note 62, at 62; see also CUNINGGIM, supra note 8,
at 79 (The universities show a variety of approaches to the study of religion: department;
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The status of religion in public universities, moreover, remained
uneven and uncertain." Part of the problem was the ongoing
questioning of the constitutional status of teaching religion;66 before
1963 "[n]o case involving religion in a state university ha[d] ever come
before the U.S. Supreme Court for consideration and decision. 67 Some
writers argued that public universities could offer religion courses as
long as "such study be academic or educational in nature rather than
devotional or indoctrinational.. 6  Others thought the state university
should stay clear of religion because "the presence of religion in any
form in a state institution is both illegal and inappropriate." 69 Professor
Cuninggim argued that schools should strengthen their courses in
religious instruction instead of ignoring them because of worries about
church/state separation.0  Paul Kauper wrote that the teaching of
religion in state universities was constitutional as long as it met certain
conditions:
There should be, e.g., no discrimination against students on religious grounds;
no religious conditions on employment or student status; no compulsory
religious services or courses; and equality of opportunity (i.e., all religions
should be taught) .... [T]he distinction should be observed between the
teaching of religion to promote knowledge and understanding and that type
interdepartmental program; comparative religion plus independent school; campus
clergy as staff; denominational Bible chairs.); Bean, supra note 9, at 59. Bean had
noticed that public and private universities could not be easily divided into categories by
their teaching of religion.
It is widely supposed that different conditions governing the treatment and status
of religion are among the essential distinctions between public and private higher
education in America. It is true, in general, that private universities have schools
or departments of religion and public ones do not, but there are major exceptions
even to this generalization [namely Iowa City School of Religion and Religious
Education at Iowa State College at Ames.].
Id.
65. See MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 5.
66. CUNINGGIM, supra note 8, at 83 ("The bogey of the separation of church and
state plagued the college officials.").
67. See Paul G. Kauper, Law and Public Opinion, in RELIGION AND THE STATE
UNIVERSITY 69, 77 (Erich A. Walter ed., 1958).
68. MICHAELSEN, supra note 9, at 5.
69. See HOLBROOK, supra note 9, at 169 (The First Amendment does not allow
any religion professors in the state universities.); CUNINGGIM, supra note 8, at 124
(citing disapprovingly John Dewey and Alvin W. Johnson).
70. CUNINGGIM, supra note 8, at 79 ("It is often considered that the principle of the
separation of church and state prevents their manifesting any strong religious interest
and assuming any real responsibility for the religious life of their students.... Suffice it
to say now that the necessity for their neutrality on the subject of religion is at least
debatable.") (emphasis added).
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aimed deliberately at indoctrination and commitment to religious faith. The
teaching of religious ideas in an objective and fair way is appropriately a state
university function. To win converts and seek commitment is outside its
71function and violates the separation principle.
As we have seen, it was not until the 1960s that American
universities followed the "parallel" pattern of Holland and other
European countries.
It was not until the rise of programs in state universities, a development which
followed the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision on the School District of
Abington v. Schempp, in which Mr. Justice Goldberg observed, "it seems clear
to me... that the Court would recognize the propriety of the teaching about
religion as distinguished from the teaching of religion in the public schools,"
that the parallel course of religious studies in the academy, instituted a century
72
ago in Holland, became possible in this country.
Conrad Cherry concludes in his study of American divinity schools
that "[b]eginning in the late 1960s, the growth of religious studies
programs in state universities would force a clear separation between
71. Kauper, supra note 67, at 92; see also MCLEAN & KIMBER, supra note 62, at
116.
This Study has shown that both the legal and the practical obstacles to teaching
programs in the field of religion in state colleges and universities may be
overcome. This is not to say that we have reached the point in the United States
where religion may be taught in public universities with integrity, nor that it is as
yet a subject which is accorded a position comparable to other major academic
disciplines. This goal has yet to be attained. But there are substantial signs that it
is not beyond attainment. It is of course possible that a cultural crisis may arise,
such as that faced in Russian or in Germany, which will make it impossible for
men of integrity to teach religion in public or quasi-public institutions. In such a
crisis, "the wall of separation" between church and state can be a boon to the
church and to liberal education. At present, however, a rapprochement between
faith and learning, between religious and secular scholarship in the western world,
particularly in the United States, appears to be a likely possibility. Such a
rapprochement will strengthen the type of programs described in this Study.
Id.; see also Louisell & Jackson, supra note 9, at 753 (concluding "that neither the
constitutions nor laws of the United States or California prevent the nondiscriminatory
establishment of religion and theology courses in state supported institutions of higher
education"). "Further, in the context of legal norms, questions about the legality of
courses such as typical ones in comparative religion or religion courses essentially
historical, descriptive, or literary seem insubstantial to the point of being frivolous;
whereas more real questions may be presented respecting certain courses in theology."
Id.
72. SMITH, supra note 37, at 103-04.
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teaching about religion and the ministry. 73  Parallel, not sequential.
Scholars in religion decided that "religious studies" was teaching about
religion and theology was teaching of religion. From that point on,
religious studies would thrive in the "secular academy" as theology
remained in the seminaries. Professor Smith has called Schempp the
"'Magna Carta' for religious studies within state universities."
74
Religious studies flourished as well in private universities; its flowering
often attributed to Schempp.75 With the growth of religious studies and
73. CONRAD CHERRY, HURRYING TOWARD ZION: UNIVERSITIES, DIVINITY
SCHOOLS, AND AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 46 (1995).
74. Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion' and 'Religious Studies': No Difference at All, 71
SOUNDINGS 231, 232 (1988).
75. See CHERRY, supra note 73, at 90 ("Aided by the Supreme Court decision in
1963 that teaching about religion, as distinct from instruction in religion, is an
acceptable undertaking in public institutions, the study of religion had won its way into
increasing numbers of colleges and universities as a nonconfessional examination of
religious phenomena."); WELCH, supra note 18, at 17 ("Expansion has been particularly
noteworthy in the public sector since the United States Supreme Court decision in the
Schempp case (1963), which in effect legitimated the formal study of religion for all
United States public education."); Robert S. Michaelsen, Reflections on the Tie That
Binds, 71 SOUNDINGS 350 (1988); Smart, supra note 50, at 68 ("Would Religious
Studies have taken off if it had not been for the benign influence of the U.S.
constitution?").
The study of religion should be distinguished from the practice of it. In the context
of the state university that assumption was understood institutionally in terms of
the separation of church from state and theoretically in terms of the distinction
between theology and the academic study of religion. A conscious effort was
made to develop or take a descriptive, analytical, non-normative, and even
(following the Supreme Court in Schempp) an "objective" approach to the subject.
However, as we are reminded more than once on these pages, the shapers of this
developing discipline or enterprise were almost all trained in theology and
ordained as clergymen. How to move from the theological seminary to the secular
university, from the church to the state, from theology to the academic study of the
subject, from the teaching of religion to the teaching about religion?
Michaelsen, supra, at 350; see also Judith A. Berling, Is Conversation About Religion
Possible? (And What Can Religionists Do to Promote It?), 61 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 1,
2 (1993); Sam Gill, The Academic Study of Religion, 62 J. AM. AcAD. RELIGION 965
(1994) ("The emergence of an academic study of religion has been disappointing despite
the boost it received thirty years ago when religion entered the curricula of state-
supported American colleges and universities.").
Theology, once the queen of the sciences and the center of the university, is now
pushed to the comers of the academy or to free-standing seminaries and all but
banished from public discourse. Religious Studies, the stepchild of a Supreme
Court decision in the 1960s, is a newcomer to the university, whose presence is
still questioned or threatened in a number of institutions.
Berling, supra, at 2; see also Dorothy C. Bass, Revolutions, Quiet and Otherwise:
Protestants and Higher Education During the 1960s, in CARING FOR THE COMMONWEAL:
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ebb in theology came a decline in the perception of religion's important
integrative role in the curriculum, in public as well as private schools.76
After Schempp, religious studies became the popular nomenclature
for American non-theological study of religion. There are other labels;
one indication of the "conceptual confusion" surrounding the academic
study of religion is the variety of names used to identify it.
Religionswissenschaft and la science des religions were the early
terms."
[T]here was no unanimity in the nineteenth century about the nomenclature
for the scholarly study of religion(s). A completely satisfactory name has yet
to be found. The designation "Hierology," or a "treatise on sacred (hieros)
things," was favored by some of the discipline's pioneers. Others preferred.
"Pistology," or the study of "faith" or "belief' systems. Other designations
EDUCATION FOR RELIGIOUS AND PUBLIC LIFE 207, 222 (Parker J. Palmer et al. eds.,
1990).
If this analysis is correct, growth in the academic study of religion was partly the
result, by a curious twist, of the expansion of secular ways of thinking in the
American academy. Even more clear is its link to another important event in the
secularization of American education. Concern about the entanglement of church
and state, which had long deterred many state universities from offering religious
studies curricula, was quieted by [Schempp]
Id.; see also Kathryn 0. Alexander, Religious Studies in American Higher Education
Since Schempp: A Bibliographical Essay, 71 SOUNDINGS 389-90 (1988). This
bibliography begins in
1963, the year when the Supreme Court decision of Abington Township School
District v. Schempp altered the total picture of the study of religion in America by
introducing the language which has governed its subsequent development in
secular, public colleges, and universities.... Separate departments and programs
devoted to the academic study of religions in public state colleges and universities
were organized as a result of this decision, and the courses and techniques they
subsequently developed presently serve as models for teaching about religions in
other tax supported schools.
Id.; see also MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 414 (1994) ("Such sentiment cleared the way for
accelerating the expansion of the study of religion in higher education during the next
decade.").
76. See Claude Welch, The Function of the Study of Religion, in THE STUDY OF
RELIGION ON THE CAMPUS OF TODAY 9, 9-11 (Karl D. Hartzell & Harrison Sasscer eds.,
1967) (As religious studies grew, support for the integrative role of religion in the
curriculum declined.).
77. See Kitagawa, supra note 25, at 17 ("The expression Religionswissenschaft
was first used in 1867 by Max Mtiller."). But see Kitagawa, supra note 23, at 131
(Muller was not first to use these terms, because la science des religions and
Religionswissenschaft had been used earlier.); ELIADE, supra note 29, at 1 ("Since
Religionswissenschaft is not easily translatable into English, we are obliged to use
'history of religions' in the broadest sense of the term, including not only history
properly speaking but also the comparative study of religions and religious morphology
and phenomenology.").
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proposed and used in some quarters were "Comparative Religion," "Science
of Comparative Religion," "The Comparative History of Religion," "The
Comparative History of Religions," "The Comparative Science of Religion,"
"Comparative Theology," and "Science of Religion."... "History of
Religions" has been adopted officially by the International Association for the
History of Religions 7(IAHR) as the English counterpart to Allgemeine
Religionswissenschaft.
The "history of religions" and "comparative religions" schools
have been successful in having their names recognized; even the
Supreme Court has advocated "comparative religion" and "history of
religion" for the curriculum of public schools.79 In this essay, I follow
Conrad Cherry's lead:
Departments and programs in the liberal arts would continue to use diverse
designations such as "religion," "history and literature of religion," and
"religion studies," as well as "religious studies." After the mid-1960s,
however, most of the literature devoted to the nature of the study of religion in
universities used the designation "religious studies," and I [Cherry] use the
term to denote a field that took on a quite different appearance from the
postwar study of religion that was shaped within the mold of theological
studies in the divinity schools.
80
Schempp receives much credit for the surge in academic religious
studies. Since its origins in Europe in the nineteenth century, the
scientific study of religion had distinguished itself from theology. Now
78. Kitagawa, supra note 23, at 129 (emphasis added).
79. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); see also
FALLERS SULLIAN, supra note 26, at 24 ("Although the academic study of religion
takes place across humanistic and social scientific disciplines as diverse and, at times, as
mutually antagonistic as anthropology, sociology, psychology, history, literature,
philosophy, linguistics, and theology, it finds a particularly intense expression in the
field of history of religions.") (emphasis added). But see ELIADE, supra note 29, at 54
n. 1.
Let us recognize it frankly. History of religions, or comparative religion, plays a
rather modest role in modem culture .... These terms are distressingly vague, but
as they belong to current language we are resigned to employing them. One
generally understands "history of religions" or "comparative religion" to mean the
integral study of the religious realities, that is to say, the historical manifestations
of a particular type of "religion" (tribal, ethnic, supranational) as well as the
specific structures of the religious life (divine forms, conceptions of the soul,
myths, rituals, etc.; institutions, etc.; typology of religious experiences, etc.).
These preliminary precisions are not at all intended to circumscribe the field or to
define the methods of the history of religions.
Id.
80. CHERRY, supra note 73, at 114 n.*.
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the Americans were ready to make their contribution; in the United
States in the 1960s and 1970s the study of religion "t[ook] off," came.
into "full flower."8' Foreign scholars at times attribute the distinctive
growth of religious studies in the United States to our separation of
church and state. In the law, however, Schempp had not settled
anything about university teaching of religion; it was a prayer and Bible
reading case set in the elementary schools. Dicta. Moreover, even at
the elementary school level one must ask what constitutional standard is
provided by "about" and "of' religion? Nonetheless, armed with
Schempp, American scholars promoted the study of religion (but not
theology) in public and private universities. They founded the
American Academy of Religion in 1964; from that point on the
academic discipline of religion became more professionalized in the
United States.82
Private as well as public universities changed their focus after
Schempp. John Wilson explained that public universities and private
secular and private religious schools converged on religious studies until
"basically similar approaches to the study of religion [existed] in all
three types of setting. 83 A "quiet revolution" had occurred. At a 1968
81. Study of Religion(s), supra note 22, at 499; Jacob Neusner, Judaism within the
Disciplines of Religious Studies: Perspectives on Graduate Education, in NEW
HUMANITIES AND ACADEMIC DIsCIPLINEs 46, 50 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1984)
(Commentators observe that in the twentieth century, the distinction between religious
studies and theology developed primarily in the English-speaking world, and was
especially important in North America.).
82. But see MARSDEN, supra note 4, at 337 ("The result was a hybrid field that
typically had Christian form and implicitly Christian direction, but in which specific
Christian purposes were subdued.").
83. Wilson, supra note 62, at 9-10; see also CHERRY, supra note 73, at 88-89;
WELCH, supra note 18, at 15 (noting the "convergence").
The Welch Report revealed more than rapid growth in the study of religion; it also
exposed some signs of the changing nature of the study. Increasing numbers of the
students receiving their doctorates from Protestant university divinity schools were
finding employment as undergraduate teachers of religion in colleges and
universities. And graduate training was no longer conforming to the pre-World
War II pattern of "preparation of the teaching ministry." In 1970, nineteen
universities in North America were offering doctorates in religion without any
reliance on theological school faculties, numerous students of religion were
receiving their graduate education in university departments such as Semitic
languages and literature and Asian studies, and fully one-half of the Ph.D.
programs at theological schools were under the administrative control of university
graduate school of the arts and sciences.
CHERRY, supra note 73, at 88-89; see also Religious Studies in Higher Education, in A
NEW DICTIONARY OF RELIGIONS 420 (John R. Hinnells ed., 1995).
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Princeton conference, Wilson predicted that this "growing convergence"
.of departments would lead to "the decline in influence and significance
of the theological traditions and a marked reduction of their roles in
shaping the study of religion., 85  Although private schools might be
expected to lament the passing of theology, its decline appeared
appropriate in the state university, where most scholars assumed that the
presence of theology is an unconstitutional teaching of religion.
Why did the professors conclude that theology is unconstitutional?
The literature on theology and religious studies is so vast that any
answer risks oversimplification. It is difficult to see how any court or
lawyer could compress the academic literature into a constitutional test,
so we should not be surprised that religion scholars, but not courts, have
chosen it as the constitutional standard8 6 Nonetheless, one can identify
some general features of theology that have made it constitutionally
suspect to scholars in religion. Theologians are insiders, not outsiders;
committed, not uncommitted; participants, not observers; normative, not
Religious studies as a new multidisciplinary subject incorporating history of
religions, cross-cultural topics, social scientific approaches and ethical and
philosophical reflections... came to prominence chiefly in the 1960s and early
1970s, with two major trends: first, the foundation of departments in some major
public universities in the USA and analogous developments in Canada and Britain;
and second, the broadening of the scope of studies in religion offered at private
institutions of higher education.
Id.; see also Harold Remus, Origins, in GRADUATE EDUCATION IN RELIGION 113, 129
(1971).
Yet the story of graduate education in religion in the 1960s and 1970s is not finally
to be told in confessional or even in ecumenical terms, but rather more and more in
relation to common scholarly endeavors cutting across and even independent of the
lines of religious traditions.
84. See Bass, supra note 75, at 222 ("Moreover, the scholarly approach adopted in
state universities was having an impact in departments of 'theology' or 'Bible' in
nonsectarian and liberal Protestant colleges as well."); see also WELCH, supra note 18,
at vii ("In what Robert Michaelsen has aptly called a 'quiet revolution,' departments of
religion and interdepartmental programs have multiplied and expanded in both private
and public institutions of higher learning.").
85. Wilson, supra note 62, at 18.
86. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 9 (1995)
("[A]lthough some content must be given to the term 'religion' for purposes of the First
Amendment, since most judges are neither theologians nor philosophers, I think it would
be most undesirable to construct a judicial definition whose administration would
require a deep understanding of these disciplines."); RONALD F. THIEMANN,
CONSTRUCTING A PUBLIC THEOLOGY: THE CHURCH IN A PLURALISTIC CULTURE 142
(1991) ("[T]he distinctions commonly drawn between theological and religious studies
are conceptually confused. These distinctions result either from a faulty understanding
of the concept 'religion' or from the political effort to justify the study of religion within
the context of the university.").
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HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 26 2000
2000] RELIGION PROFESSORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 27
descriptive; located in divinity schools, not universities; religious, not
secular. Those characteristics raise the spectre of the Establishment
Clause in a way that the secular detached professor of religious studies
does not-at least in the eyes of the religion professors.
Under these criteria, our hypothetical Professors One and Four are
clearly theologians. Professor Two is the quintessential religious
studies professor. Professor Three may be a religious studies professor,
if he is sufficiently detached in his analysis and presentation of the
believing visitors. A zoo of Professor Three's visitors would be a
Department of Theology or a Divinity School, but not a Department of
Religious Studies.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S INSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
Religion scholars were confident in identifying and applying the
about/of, religious studies/theology constitutional standard. It is not,
however, the Court's own standard. In practice, the Supreme Court
never did compress religious studies and theology into a constitutional
test. In concurrence in Schempp, Justice Brennan agreed that "[t]he
holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose teaching about the
Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects in
classes in literature or history. 87 Yet he observed that this distinction
between teaching about and of religion was too difficult for courts to
interpret. "To what extent, and at what points in the curriculum,
religious materials should be cited are matters which the courts ought to
entrust very largely to the experienced officials who superintend our
Nation's public schools. They are experts in such matters, and we are
not.,88 Brennan urged the Court to "heed Mr. Justice Jackson's caveat"
(in McCollum) and not "announce curricular standards. 89
In McCollum, one of the early cases about religion in the schools,
Mr. Justice Jackson had stated that: "When instruction turns to
proselyting and imparting knowledge becomes evangelism is, except in
the crudest cases, a subtle inquiry." 9 Such subtlety is the professional
obligation of religious studies. However, this inquiry has been too
subtle for the Supreme Court, and so its First Amendment decisions
87. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 300 (1963).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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have been based on other grounds. Curricular matters, including fine
academic points about theology and religious studies, have usually been
beyond the Court's expertise and interest. Justice Jackson warned of the
Court's minimal expertise in religious education: "[i]t is a matter on
which we can find no law but our own prepossessions."9'
Instead of focusing on the curriculum, in the First Amendment
religion cases set in schools, the justices have been attentive to
institutional status, examining the nature of the schools instead of the
content of the courses. If they could not interpret about and of, they
could distinguish a religious from a public school. By 1963 (i.e., before
Schempp) the analytical framework for First Amendment
jurisprudence-the institutional principle-had already been set in
Everson v. Board of Education92 and McCollum. Scholars looked past
their public or private school setting to a common discipline, but the
public/religious school distinction was the justices' bright line for
resolving First Amendment cases. Although religion programs
converged in different types of institutions, on the Court the differences
in institutions were accentuated.
In Everson, a New Jersey statute provided transportation for
students to public as well as non-public schools (in Justice Black's
expression, "church schools"). 93 The Court acknowledged that these
schools provide "secular education" but emphasized their "religious"
nature.9' In dissent, Justice Jackson explained the difference between
secular and religious schools:
Our public school.., is organized on the premise that secular education can
be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all
needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to
religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in
worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion .... The
function of the Church school is a subject on which this record is meager ...
But we know that such schools are parochial only in name they, in fact,
represent a world-wide and age-old policy of the Roman Catholic Church....
Catholic education is the rock on which the whole structure rests, and to
render tax aid to its Church school is indistinguishable to me from rendering
the same aid to the Church itself.
95
91. Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
92. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 22-24 (emphasis added).
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HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 28 2000
2000] RELIGION PROFESSORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 29
The significant point about the schools is not their role in secular
education; religious schools remain religious (like churches) no matter
how secular their curriculum. (And public schools secular no matter
how religious?) The result in Everson is that all students may receive
the (neutral) bus ride (which occurs neither on public nor church school
grounds) but the secular public school versus church school distinction
has been established for future cases.
The institutional focus of the Court's analysis is evident in the
different outcomes of the two "released-time" cases, McCollum and
Zorach v. Clauson.9 In Illinois,
religious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were permitted to
come weekly into the [public] school buildings during the regular hours set
apart for secular teaching, and then and there for a period of thirty minutes
substitute their religious teaching for the secular education provided under the
compulsory education law.
97
The Court ruled in McCollum that this program violated the
Establishment Clause.
Many readers have reiterated Justice Reed's complaint in dissent
that it is difficult to state the holding of McCollum. 98 The difficulty of
interpreting McCollum became clearer four years later, when the Court
upheld a New York released time program in Zorach.
New York City has a program which permits its public schools to release
students during the school day so that they may leave the school buildings and
school grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or
devotional exercises. A student is released on written request of his parents.
Those not released stay in the classrooms. The churches make weekly reports
96. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
97. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205 (1948).
98. See id. at 240.
I find it difficult to extract from the opinions any conclusion as to what it is in the
Champaign plan that is unconstitutional. Is it the use of school buildings for
religious instruction; the release of pupils by the schools for religious instruction
during school hours; the so-called assistance by teachers in handing out the request
cards to pupils, in keeping lists of them for release and records of their attendance;
or the action of the principals in arranging an opportunity for the classes and the
appearance of the Council's instructors? None of the reversing opinions say
whether the purpose of the Champaign plan for religious instruction during school
hours is unconstitutional or whether it is some ingredient used in or omitted from
the formula that makes the plan unconstitutional.
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to the schools, sending a list of children who have been released from public
school but who have not reported for religious instruction."
The Court upheld the New York program, with Justice Douglas
distinguishing Illinois from New York: "This 'released time' program
involves neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor the
expenditure of public funds."' °
The instruction is no different in McCollum and Zorach (it is
religious), but the location is. In dissent in Zorach, Justice Black
complained: "I see no significant difference between the invalid Illinois
system and that of New York here sustained. Except for the use of the
school buildings in Illinois, there is no difference between the systems
which I consider even worthy of mention."' ' Years later, in Schempp,
Justice Brennan explained why he thought that the institutional setting
mattered in the released-time cases:
The deeper difference was that the McCollum program placed the religious
instructor in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority
held by the regular teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did
not. The McCollum program, in lending to the support of sectarian instruction
all the authority of the governmentally operated public school system, brought
government and religion into that proximity which the Establishment Clause
forbids. To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands substantial
respect and merits attention in his own right. But the Constitution does not
permit that prestige and capacity for influence to be augmented by investiture
of all the symbols of authority at the command of the lay teacher for the
enhancement of secular instruction."' 2
99. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 308-09; see also Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A
Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 379-80 (1963).
[T]he Court [in Zorach] has made clear that the establishment clause forbids
governmental indoctrination of religious beliefs and public school religious
instruction. Under the proposed constitutional standard, this effort to inculcate
religious beliefs would unquestionably be a solely religious activity likely to
influence and compromise the students' freedom of conscientious choice.
However, it is totally inaccurate to conclude, as many have done, that this rejection
"sanctions [the public schools'] utilization for the purposes of atheists." This
would be correct only if the public schools were either constitutionally permitted
or forced to teach that there is no God.
Id.
101. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
102. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262-63 (1963) (emphasis
added).
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Religion scholars focus, not on the location, but on the content and
quality of the instruction, which merits attention in its own right. Their
course and their authority can be the same in the two settings. After
Schempp, the religious and public universities converged on religious
studies without regard to institution.
The institutional view has not always commanded five votes on the
Court. (Nor is First Amendment jurisprudence coherent enough to be
explained by one theory.) For example, in upholding a law providing
secular (but not religious) books to religious schools, Justice White
stated in Board of Education v. Allen'°3 that "religious schools pursue
two goals, religious instruction and secular education."1' 4
[We] cannot agree with appellants either that all teaching in a sectarian school
is religious or that the processes of secular and religious training are so
intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in
fact instrumental in the teaching of religion.... Nothing in this record
supports the proposition that all textbooks, whether they deal with
mathematics, physics, foreign languages, history, or literature, are used by the
parochial schools to teach religion. No evidence has been offered about
particular schools, particular courses, particular teachers, or particular
books."°5
103. 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).
104. Id.
105. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 133 (1992).
In Board of Education v. Allen, for example, the Supreme Court permitted the state
to provide textbooks to parochial school students only if they used the same
secular textbooks that the public schools used. This holding effectively required
the parochial schools to secularize their curriculum if they wished to receive
assistance.
Id.; see also DRINAN, supra note 13, at 65-66; Rosenfield, supra note 16, at 563 (citing
Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930) ("In 1930, the Court sustained a Louisiana
decision enabling school boards to provide secular school books to children attending
religious schools.").
In all the agonizing efforts over the course of two or three generations by the
members of these four groups to control public education, the center of the stage
has always been courses on religion, instruction about religion, training in
character development or admittedly sectarian indoctrination by way of released
time. Seldom, if ever, have any of the interested groups approached the real heart
of the matter: the faith of the teachers and the ideological outlook of the textbooks.
It is, after all, hardly worthwhile to protest the presence or absence of such
religious symbols as Bible-reading, nonsectarian prayers and even released time if
the teacher and the textbook he employs are, consciously or otherwise, working on
behalf of one of the "conspiracies."
DRINAN, supra note 13, at 155.
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Yet Allen is atypical; Lemon v. Kurtzman1°6 has provided the
influential First Amendment standard. The Pennsylvania Lemon law
provided a salary supplement to nonpublic school teachers who taught
secular courses, but did not allow funding to teachers of religion. The
Rhode Island statute allowed reimbursements to nonpublic schools for
salaries of teachers, textbooks and instructional materials. The Court
summarized the state laws this way:
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial support
to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for
the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
specified secular subjects. Rhode Island has adopted a statute under which the
State pays directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement
of 15% of their annual salary.107
The course material was secular. Indeed, in Rhode Island teachers
had to "agree in writing 'not to teach a course in religion for so long as
or during such time as he or she receives any salary supplements"'1 8 In
Pennsylvania, reimbursement was permitted only for "'secular'
subjects: mathematics, modem foreign languages, physical science, and
physical education," 1°9 and was explicitly prohibited for Latin, Hebrew,
and classical Greek.110
The Court ruled according to its three-part test that both statutes
were unconstitutional because of the difficulty of monitoring the secular
subjects. "Under the Lemon test, the government violates the
establishment clause if the government's primary purpose is to advance
religion, or if the principal effect is to aid or inhibit religion, or if there
John C. Bennett confesses to a change of mind on the matter of the validity of free
textbooks to nonpublic school children. He writes: 'I once thought that the
provision of transportation was more readily defensible than the provision of
school books, but the following considerations cause me to change that view: (1)
School books which are the same as those used in the public schools do not aid
religious education. (2) The cost is equivalent to the cost of such books if children
went to the public schools which they have every right to do, whereas in the case
of buses not only extra seats but extra routes may be involved. (3) The use of these
books in both systems of schools is in the interest of the unity of the community.
Id.
106. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
107. Id. at 606-07.
108. Id. at 608.
109. Id. at 610.
110. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610 n.4.
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is excessive government entanglement with religion."''. "Church
schools" can be entirely secular yet not receive aid under Lemon
because the state supervision of the secularity creates an "excessive
entanglement" between church and state, a prong three violation.
Justice Rehnquist has criticized this prong as "the 'Catch-22' paradox of
[the Court's] own creation.., whereby aid must be supervised to ensure
no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause an




The institutional analysis reached it apex in 1985 in Aguilar v.
Felton"4 and its companion case, School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball."' Both cases involved remedial education and services that the
states provided by sending public school teachers into parochial schools.
The course content was secular: "remedial reading, reading skills,
remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance
services." 6 In Ball, the Court expressed its fear that persons, namely
public school teachers, are not able to withstand the influence of
religious institutions; "[t]eachers in such an atmosphere may well subtly
(or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they
teach."" 7 Because Grand Rapids did not supervise the program for such
influence, the Court ruled that their program was unconstitutional. New
York did superintend, but the Court ruled that the New York program
was unconstitutional because monitoring the program entangled church
and state. Lemon, Catch-22. In response to Aguilar, New York
developed the ultimate institutional response: because public school
teachers were not permitted to enter private school classrooms, vans-
"mobile instruction units [MIU's]"-were set up next door to the
private schools.
The institutional principle has been important to First Amendment
jurisprudence, but it stops at the university door. On the same day in
1973 that the Court struck down state reimbursement to nonpublic
111. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 969 (1997); see also Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612-13.
112. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (citation omitted).
113. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., concurring).
114. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
115. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
116. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406.
117. Ball, 473 U.S. at 388; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) (In
Ball, "a majority found a 'substantial risk' that teachers-even those who were not
employed by the private schools-might 'subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to
the [pervasively sectarian] environment in which they [taught]."').
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elementary and secondary schools in Lemon,"8 it upheld in Tilton v.
Richardson"9 the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which
provided construction grants to nonpublic colleges and universities,
including Sacred Heart University, Annhurst College, Fairfield
University, and Albertus Magnus College. Justice Brennan protested
that "a sectarian university is the equivalent in the realm of higher
education of the Catholic elementary schools in Rhode Island.', 12 0 He
joined
Brother WHITE['s] cogent[] comment[] ... Why the federal program in the
Tilton case is not embroiled with the same difficulties (as the Rhode Island
program) is never adequately explained.' ... I do not see any significant
difference in the Federal Government's telling the sectarian university not to
teach any nonsecular subjects in a certain buildin , and Rhode Island's telling
the Catholic school teacher not to teach religion.
In Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 2 2 the Court upheld a
Maryland
statute which, as amended, provides for annual noncategorical grants to
private colleges [including Western Maryland College, College of Notre
Dame, Mount St. Mary's, St. Joseph College and Loyola College], among
them religiously affiliated institutions, subject only to the restrictions that the
funds not be used for 'sectarian purposes' [including seminary and theological
students].
What is noteworthy about Tilton and Roemer for our purposes is
that in those cases the Court mentioned the academic study of religion.
In Tilton, the opponents of state aid had argued that the private colleges
should not receive funds because they were pervasively religious. One
important indicator of a school's religiosity was its theology department;
the funded schools had such departments. From the characteristics of a
theology department, the parties and the Court drew conclusions about
the nature of the institution. The Court observed that the Catholic
colleges required courses in theology, but noted that the parties had
stipulated that:
118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
119. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
120. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 659.
121. Id. at 660.
122. 426 U.S. 736, 739 (1976).
123. Id.
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these courses are taught according to the academic requirements of the subject
matter and the teacher's concept of professional standards. The parties also
stipulated that the courses covered a range of human religious experiences and
are not limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion. The schools
introduced evidence that they made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to
proselytize. Indeed, some of the required theology courses at Albertus
Magnus and Sacred Heart are taught by rabbis.'
24
Thus, in Tilton, "the evidence show[ed] institutions with admittedly
religious functions but whose predominant higher education mission is
to provide their students with a secular education."'
25
In Roemer, however,
[t]he District Court did not make the same finding with respect to theology
and religion courses taught at the appellee colleges. It made no contrary
finding, but simply was "unable to characterize the course offerings in these
subjects." There was a "possibility" that "these courses could be devoted to
deepening religious experiences in the particular faith rather than to teaching
theology as an academic discipline." The court considered this possibility
sufficient to require that the Council for Higher Education take steps to insure
that no PUblic funds would be used to support religion and theology
126programs.
To religion scholars, the departments and courses appear different
(or at least susceptible of characterization). The Tilton courses could be
theology or religious studies. The Roemer courses are possibly
theology. The Court allowed funding to both sets of schools, but to
neither theology department because the state may not fund "religious
instruction, training, or worship.' ' 127 Note that religion scholars might be
more critical of the Tilton courses than the Court was; religious studies
opposes theology. Religious studies would certainly disapprove of
those Roemer "classes [that] are begun with prayer.' '128 The Court did
not address the possibility that the Tilton courses were secular religious
studies offerings and so worthy of funding. 129
124. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
126. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 756 n.20 (1976); see also Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
127. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679-80.
128. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 757.
129. For some effects of Tilton and Roemer, see EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY JR. &
PHILIP R. MOOTS, GOVERNMENT AND CAMPUS: FEDERAL REGULATION OF RELIGIOUSLY
AFFILIATED HIGHER EDUCATION 102 (1982).
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The Court's standard of secularity in Tilton and Roemer is not
clear. Justice Stewart, in dissent in Roemer, argued that the nature of
the theology department was determinative and was reason to
distinguish Roemer from Tilton. "In Tilton the Court emphasized that
the theology courses were taught as academic subjects. Here, by
contrast, the District Court was unable to find that the compulsory
religion courses were taught as an academic discipline. 1 3° Because the
religion courses were required, they might indoctrinate or foster
"religious experience," funding of which is clearly barred by the
Establishment Clause. Justice Stewart observed that in the Roemer
schools the religion and theology departments were staffed "chiefly with
clerics of the affiliated church," and at two schools all department
members were clerics.1' Accordingly, the classes might be spiritual as
well as academic.
Religion scholars can agree with Justice Stewart about the
affiliation of the professor. Claude Welch opposed the "confessional
principle" according to which only members of a faith can teach it.132 In
his opinion, as we have seen, "[n]o department should be regarded as a
For example, the president of a major Roman Catholic university in the Midwest
reported that its "Department of Religious Studies" (which does not train or
educate for theological degreees [sic]) is prohibited from conducting courses in a
building partially funded by federal loans and grants. In a subsequent telephone
conversation this university administrator expressed the view that the federal
statute should not be interpreted to prohibit this kind of use, but stated that the
university had declined to press the matter with federal officials lest it risk losing
the loan. That complaint was echoed by a Lutheran college in the Midwest, and a
small Roman Catholic college in the Southwest reported that offices of faculty
persons who taught religious studies were required to be moved out of a federally
funded building that housed all of the other members of the humanities faculty of
that college. The president of a small, two-year United Methodist college in the
South wondered why his institution was unable to use a building partially funded
with federal funds for "religious instruction" when a neighboring state university
uses its publicly funded buildings for that purpose.
Id.
130. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 773 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
131. Id.
132. Welch, supra note 76, at 11 ("I mean the notion that only a Protestant can
teach about Protestantism, a Jew about Judaism, a Catholic about Catholicism, a
Buddhist about Buddhism, and by implication, a Hegelian about Hegel."); see also
WELCH, supra note 18, at 16 (rejecting the "zoo" theory, "according to which religion
can be dealt with only by exhibiting representative members of the various species," as
well as the "insider theory," "according to which no one except an adherent can
legitimately interpret or even understand a religious tradition").
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museum or a zoo, responsible for exhibiting all species of believers."'
33
Although Welch acknowledged that "other things being equal, an
articulate representative of a religion will be better able to convey the
facts and various nuances of that religion than a man who is not
affiliated with it," he insisted that scholarly credentials, not confessional
affiliation, were the most important attribute of the professor of religion.
Clerical faculty might be confessional, not scholarly. The primacy of
scholarly over confessional commitment is a core characteristic of
religious studies. Justice Stewart speaks in the religious studies
tradition when he criticizes the clerical status of the Roemer faculty. Of
course, Professor Welch might not be content that the Tilton majority
praised the presence of a rabbi at Albertus Magnus and Sacred Heart.
Was the rabbi a good scholar?
In any event, the content of the courses did not determine the
Court's decisions, which rested instead on the distinction between
college students and the lower grades. In Tilton the Court concluded:
"There is substance to the contention that college students are less
impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination. ,14 The
133. Hartzell, supra note 3, at 62; Richard Schlatter, The Nature and Formulation
of Academic Disciplines, in THE STUDY OF RELIGION ON THE CAMPUS OF TODAY 16, 21
(Karl D. Hartzell & Harrison Sasscer eds., 1967) ("We want scholar-teachers, but what
we have available is a roster of liberal Protestant apologists and evangelists with an
occasional Jew or Jesuit thrown in to make it appear respectably broad-minded.").
134. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971); see also ROBERT GORDIS ET
AL., RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS 28-29 (1959).
It is generally agreed that whatever difficulties inhere in the teaching of religion
they are minimal on the college level. Here the relative maturity of the students
and the atmosphere of free intellectual inquiry offer assurance that not
indoctrination but education will be the guiding principle, both in the discussion of
the religious factor in history and in special courses in religion offered in the
curriculum.
1d; see also Choper, supra note 100, at 383 ("Thus, it may be argued that the
establishment clause demands that the objective study of religion or the Bible be
confined to those higher grades where the influencing or compromising of religious
beliefs would not occur because the audience is adult enough to distinguish between
indoctrination and academic discussion."). But see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
668 (1971) (White, J., concurring) ("Surely the notion that college students are more
mature and resistant to indoctrination is a makeweight."); Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
What the Congress Can Do When the Court is Wrong, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EIGHTIES 79, 80 (Edward McGlynn
Gaffney Jr. ed., 1981).
I would maintain that the Court has been egregiously wrong in much of the
reasoning it has employed in defense of its decisions concerning public aid for
nonpublic education. For example, the Court was reduced to saying in Tilton that a
federal statute that provided aid to a Catholic college was constitutional, but that
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Court later summarized the differences between colleges and high
schools in Roemer: "College students are less susceptible to religious
indoctrination; college courses tend to entail an internal discipline that
inherently limits the opportunities for sectarian influence; and a high
degree of academic freedom tends to prevail at the college level.' 35
In these cases, then, the Court did not resolve our specific
questions about the teaching of religion in state universities. The
professors were free to develop their own constitutional standard. They
selected about/of, religious studies/theology.
III. THE CRITICS: THEOLOGIANS, THEISTS, JURISTS
There the story might end, with religious studies in the schools and
the institutional principle on the Court. However, by the 1980s
discontent with the status quo simmered in the universities and on the
Court as theologians and theists questioned their exclusion from the
schools and jurists questioned the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence.
A. Neglect of Theology
Within the academic world of religious studies in the 1980s, some
scholars began to identify an "identity crisis."'3 6 This crisis had many
dimensions, but one aspect is a complaint about exclusion and hostility:
the exclusion of theology from academic religion because of hostility
from religious studies scholars. Perhaps Wilson's 1968 prediction about
similarly direct subventions to a Catholic high school would be unconstitutional,
because of a presumably well known difference in religious impressionability as
between college freshmen and high school seniors. If you'll say that, you'll say
anything.
Id.
135. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 750.
136. Claude Welch used this expression before the 1980s. See WELCH, supra note
18, at 13; see also Darlene Juschka, Religious Studies and Identity Politics: Mythology
in the Making, 26 BULLEnN/CSSR 8 (Feb. 1997).
Religious Studies has suffered from an identity crisis since its conception. This
crisis has meant that it has cloistered itself from other university disciplines.
Neither theology nor a Humanity or Social Science, it stands alone, and will, in the
face of downsizing, fall alone. It would be to the benefit of Religious Studies, if it
is to survive as a discipline, to understand itself as having data in common with
theology, but as employing an interpretive method of analysis, like other Humanity
or Social Sciences disciplines.
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the decline of theological traditions had come true by 1989, when Van
Harvey commented on the "intellectual marginality of American
theology."'3 7 In a 1992 presidential address to the American Academy
of Religion (the professional association of scholars in religion, whose
1964 founding and journal "called attention to, and in some ways even
created, the academic field of 'religious studies'"), 38 Robert Cummings
Neville stated that "[t]he visible part of the crisis is the feeling of many
people engaged in theological studies, particularly those who
themselves are committed to the practice of religion, that they are not
welcome in the Academy.' 3 9  Some theologians raised a different
question, suggesting that the academic study of religion had declined in
influence (and perhaps as an academic discipline) because of the neglect
of theology. ',
Neville's speech echoed some of the conclusions of the 1991 Hart
Report on the status of religious studies and theology in American
universities, a successor to the Welch report of another era.' 41 One Hart
report finding was that many religion faculty members-especially
those at public universities-state that theology does not belong in the
public school. 42 Hart observed
137. Van A. Harvey, On the Intellectual Marginality of American Theology, in
RELIGION AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 172 (Michael J.
Lacey ed., 1989).
138. CHERRY, supra note 73, at 114.
139. Robert Cummings Neville, Religious Studies and Theological Studies, 61 J.
AM. ACAD. RELIGION 185, 185 (1993). But see id. at 186 ("The life of the Academy is
by no means in crisis but is flourishing. The crisis is in the sense of identity.").
140. See, e.g., GEORGE LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND
THEOLOGY IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE 124 (1984).
Perhaps the last American theologian who in practice (and to some extent in
theory) made extended and effective attempts to redescribe major aspects of the
contemporary scene in distinctively Christian terms was Reinhold Niebuhr. After
the brief neoorthodox interlude (which was itself sometimes thoroughly liberal in
its theological methodology, as in the case of Paul Tillich), the liberal tendency to
redescribe religion in extrascriptural frameworks has once again become dominant.
Id.
141. Ray L. Hart, Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher
Education: A Pilot Study, 59 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 715 (1991).
142. See id. at 731-32. At the two public universities with small departments, every
faculty member identified her/himself in RS and rejected ThS as appropriate to such a
department (the only type in the sample to be unanimous on this matter).
In the second category of public universities with a large department having both
undergraduate and graduate programs, a clear majority of faculty identified
themselves in RS and indicated antipathy toward ThS (at one, 85% in RS, 15%
rejecting the distinction as pertinent to their work; at the other, 58% clearly in RS,
17% rejecting the distinction, and 25% saying they were in "neither."
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[a] sharp distinction between RS and ThS, with ThS the bete noire within RS:
this appears to be the passion of public institutions, and is especially strong in
those with graduate programs (as it is in private universities with graduate
programs). ... The majority of faculty in public and private universities with
graduate programs oppose ThS in their programs, under whatever self-
construal of "theology."... The younger the scholar and the more recently out
of graduate school, the more evident is the antipathy to "theology" in RS in
this sector of higher education.
43
Charles Kegley is more pointed in his description of the
controversy: "[Rieligious studies specialists (not to mention
philosophers) have come to look upon association with theologians as a
mark of intellectual degeneration. They are not inclined to go on any
academic slumming."'"
Theologians were not alone in their criticism; some Christian
professors argued that universities had become the home of "established
nonbelief" (perhaps part of a broader "culture of disbelief").'45 On the
religious studies front, in the 1980s Professor Smith suggested that the
extensive debate by religion scholars about the religious studies
standard was a political battle within the academy, not an academic or
constitutional one.
As usually understood, the distinction between religion and religious studies
reduces to some version of the duality between "being religious" or "doing
religion" and the study of the same.... It is a preeminently political contrast,
one of value in carving out a place for the study of religion within the
Id.
143. Id. at 732. For an early diagnosis of the problem, see MIICHAELSEN, supra note
9, at 157.
In America .... theology has been at most a peripheral enterprise in the life of the
university. And it continues to be regarded with suspicion by many in the
university-because of its historic association with a community of faith and its
presumed unscientific nature. Thus the questions of whether theology is a
legitimate academic discipline and of whether it should have a place in a curricular
program in religion can be and sometimes are hotly debated. And theological
studies are largely untouched in most state universities.
Id.
He left his readers with the unanswered question: should theologians be included on the
faculty of the state university?
144. Charles W. Kegley, Theology and Religious Studies: Friends or Enemies?, 35
THEOLOGY TODAY 273, 277 (1978) ("Curiously, many of their colleagues in the faculty,
for example, physical and social scientists, have the same misgivings about the work of
those engaged in religious studies. The latter are suspect and often treated as second
class citizens in academia.").
145. See, e.g., STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DiSBELIEF (1993); MARSDEN,
supra note 4.
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university, but of dubious value beyond. It is, quite frankly, a ploy. ... The
political distinction was, at heart, a counsel to passivity and integration, not
to interesting thought.
As a sheerly political move, analogous to other self-justifications from other
fields who sought recognition and legitimation from centers of articulate
power, the distinction can be applauded. Raised to the level of theory, it has
proved mischievous, especially when confused with other sorts of distinctions
such as those between the "insider" and the "outsider"-the "emic" and the
"etic" in contemporary jargon. Its most current formulation is that between
the normative and the descriptive. 46
In the religious studies battle of the 1960s, the religion scholars had
found a powerful ally in the Supreme Court of the United States. In the
1980s, however, the Court also confronted serious criticism for its
hostility to religion.
B. Discrimination Against Religious Viewpoints
Beginning in 1981, in the law, students (not faculty) brought their
complaints about the schools to the Supreme Court. Starting with
146. Smith, supra note 74, at 232; see also TmEMANN, supra note 86, at 142.
Though the distinction is not conceptually justifiable, it has had an important
political function in the struggle to establish the intellectual viability of the study
of religion within American universities. That vital struggle continues, and thus it
is important to ask whether this conceptually illusionary distinction has an
enduring political function.
Id.; Jonathan Z. Smith, Here and Now: Prospects for Graduate Education, in NEW
HUMANITES AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINEs 40, 42 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1984).
First, the debates over the nature of the academic study of religion have rarely been
substantive; they have been largely political and tactical. That is to say, they have
been informed by concerns not so much indigenous to the academy as appropriate
to legislative bodies and legal questions of the relationship between church and
state. Second, until recently, the graduate study of religion was preceded, in the
typical student's career, by a course of postbaccalaureate professional study within
a theological faculty.
Id.; Juschka, supra note 136, at 8.
Caught between ecumenicism (which is possibly disguised colonialism) and value-
neutral objective study (which posits scientific epistemology as Truth), Religious
Studies doesn't know just what it is. It suffers from the Jekyll/Hyde syndrome-
either the cold observer or the impassioned participant. It is this identity crisis that
is indicative of a pathology, but a pathology that is reflective of events beyond the
boundaries of Religious Studies.
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Widmar v. Vincent,'4 7 evangelical Christian students won victories in the
Supreme Court with complaints that they were unfairly excluded from
the public schools due to discrimination against their religious
viewpoints. These cases involved access to school facilities and use of
those facilities for worship and religious discussion groups. In Widmar,
for example, the Court ruled that the University of Missouri may not bar
evangelical Christian student groups from using university buildings for
extracurricular religious worship and religious teaching. The students
won because their free speech rights protected them from (religious)
viewpoint discrimination. In one sense, too much religion had been
excluded from these public schools and the Court moved to right the
balance. This line of cases culminated in the 1995 Rosenberger
decision.
Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s, the justices began to express
their own dissatisfaction with the Court's hostility to religion. Their
favorite target was Lemon, and their criticism challenged the
institutional principle. For example, in Board of Education v. Grumet,148
three justices (Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas) joined two of the original
dissenters (O'Connor and Rehnquist) to encourage reconsideration of
Aguilar v. Felton. Those justices suggested that the institutional
principle was not neutral but instead was anti-religious. From Justice
Scalia ("I heartily agree that these cases, so hostile to our national
tradition of accommodation, should be overruled at the earliest
opportunity.") 149 to Justice O'Connor ("It is the Court's insistence on
disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led New York to favor it here.") 150
the institutional principle was under siege. The Court overruled Aguilar
in Agostini v. Felton.5'
On the Court, the Schempp line was never as important as the
institutional principle. Scholars who have relied on Schempp, however,
should review the Court's 1995 Rosenberger decision. On its facts,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia is a case
about student funding, with no implications for a department of religion.
Yet its analysis of religion (especially the disagreement between Justice
Kennedy and the dissenting Justice Souter) is noteworthy in the context
of the academic and constitutional debates about teaching religion.
147. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
148. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
149. Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 716 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
151. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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Rosenberger suggests that the Schempp distinction between teaching
about and of religion has been abandoned.
Taken together, Agostini and Rosenberger suggest a change in
constitutional arguments about teaching religion. We do not yet know
how the scholars will respond.
IV. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD:
ROSENBERGER AND AGOSTINI
A. The Erosion of Schempp?
In Rosenberger the Supreme Court ruled that the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment requires the University of Virginia to
fund a student publication, Wide Awake. Wide Awake has a "two-fold
mission: 'to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to
the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means., 152 The paper had run
articles on a wide range of subjects, including racism, pregnancy,
prayer, C.S. Lewis, music, homosexuality and eating disorders. "Each
page of Wide Awake, and the end of each article or review, is marked by
a cross."'
53
The original University Guidelines barred funding to a "religious
activity," namely "any activity that primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."'' 54 The
University denied Wide Awake's request for funds; editor Ronald
Rosenberger appealed the denial of funding. The Supreme Court ruled
in his favor, concluding that once the state creates a public forum, the
First Amendment prohibits it from viewpoint discrimination. The
majority opinion stated that in these circumstances religion is a
viewpoint, not only a subject matter.' 5  The Free Speech Clause
prohibits the state from discriminating on the basis of viewpoint in the
forum it has created. The state has created a forum in which student
groups receive funding for publications; it may not discriminate against
152. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but
it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which
a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.").
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Rosenberger's Christian viewpoint in its award of student activity funds
in that forum.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated that under the
Speech Clause of the First Amendment the government may set the
subject matter of a public forum; once it has opened that forum it may
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Religion can be both a
subject matter and a viewpoint, but in the Virginia circumstances the
guidelines discriminated against religious viewpoint and so violated the
First Amendment. We learn in more detail in Justice Kennedy's
opinion what is wrong with the regulation:
Were the prohibition applied with much vigor at all, it would bar funding of
essays by hypothetical student contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and
Descartes ... undergraduates named Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-
Paul Sartre would likewise have some of their major essays excluded from
student publications.... it is indeed difficult to name renowned thinkers
whose writings would be accepted, save perhaps for articles disclaiming all
connection to their ultimate philosophy. Plato could contrive perhaps to
submit an acceptable essay on making pasta or peanut butter cookies, provided
he did not point out their (necessary) imperfections. 1
6
To Justice Kennedy if one excludes Rosenberger one must exclude
Plato; who would bar Plato from a student newspaper?
Justice Souter?
No. Justice Souter's standard funds Plato, Spinoza and Descartes
but not Rosenberger. In dissent he challenged the majority's broad
reading of religious viewpoint. Souter focused on subject, not
viewpoint; the government (as Justice Kennedy concedes) may set the
subject matter of the public forum. According to Justice Souter,
however, Wide Awake's "subject is not the discourse of the scholar's
study or the seminar room, but of the evangelist's mission station and
the pulpit. It is nothing other than the preaching of the word, which
(along with the sacraments) is what most branches of Christianity offer
those called to the religious life."'57 The Establishment Clause prohibits
government funding of the subject matter of evangelism. Souter
suggests a constitutional standard different from Kennedy's: the state
may not fund the evangelism or proselyting of Rosenberger but it may
fund academic discourse. These are two different subjects. The
Establishment Clause permits the funding of the scholar but forbids the
156. Id. at 836.
157. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
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state to "pay the preacher to preach." ' 8  Justice Kennedy does not
recognize this distinction, but it is the Court's own standard, set in
McCollum, Engel, and Schempp (the classic First Amendment cases),
that has kept "core religious activities," including prayer and religious
instruction, from the nation's public schools. 59
Perhaps Justice Souter is familiar with religious studies when he
mentions "the discourse of the scholar's study or the seminar room."'"
Professor Smith uses the same expression to explain that
[r]eligion is a creation of the scholar's study. .. . It is created by the scholar's
imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no
independent existence apart from the academy. For this reason, the student of
religion must be exquisitely self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness
constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost object of study.
Religious studies is not evangelism; one of its defining
characteristics is its secularity. "[T]he study of religion is a uniquely
Western phenomenon, flourishing in particular under secular auspices
on the one side, or under the auspices of religious people attempting to
address a secular, or at least an alien, world on the other.' ' 62  Its
secularity is part of its intellectual challenge to scholars, as Justice
Jackson recognized: "[tihe task of separating the secular from the
religious in education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy. 163
In Rosenberger, Kennedy acknowledged Souter's standard but
rejected it, and he suggested that the line between "religious speech"
and "speech about religion" is too hard to draw.'6 It is beyond judicial
competence to administer this test; indeed its application would require
"censorship" from the Court. 65 Justice Kennedy sounds the Jackson
note-that courts cannot judge curricular requirements, especially
158. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments:
Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 243, 247 (1996).
159. See, e.g., Choper, supra note 100, at 335 ("Although these governmental
programs aid religion, they may not be fairly characterized as solely religious activities.
However, other practices, such as prayer recitation and Bible reading, must be fairly
characterized as solely religious activities having no independent primary nonreligious
purpose. ").
160. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
161. Jonathan Z. Smith, No Need to Travel to the Indies: Judaism and the Study of
Religion, in TAKE JUDAISM, FOR ExAMPLE 215, 217 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1983).
162. Neusner, supra note 81, at 49.
163. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
164. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845.
165. See id. at 844.
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matters concerning religion. However, in response to this traditional
problem, Kennedy offered a solution not envisioned by Jackson (who
stated that "we... can at all times prohibit teaching of creed and
catechism and ceremonial and can forbid forthright proselyting in the
schools' 66): to fund evangelism itself. Because the about/of standard is
too hard to decipher, the state must fund everything. If "of religion" is
now a viewpoint, not a subject, then it must always be included, must
always receive funding.
Once religious speech cannot be distinguished from speech about
religion, we have lost the line of Schempp, the legal distinction that
influenced the fate of religious studies. So what? It was always dicta.
The loss of the Schempp standard may pose a hardship to religious
studies but should be insignificant to jurisprudence; about/of was never
central to the Court's decisions. Those justices who disregarded the
Schempp line had depended on an alternative test, the institutional
principle, which was within judicial competence to administer. Justice
Kennedy can still refuse funding to private schools under the Court's
old institutional principle. Or can he? That old institutional line is
blurred by Agostini.
B. The Erosion of the Institutional Principle
The Court had already strayed from the institutional principle
before Agostini was decided in 1997. In 1985, the Court ruled that the
Establishment Clause did not prevent the State of Washington from
providing vocational rehabilitative assistance to Larry Witters, a blind
student who was studying to become a pastor at the Inland Empire
School of the Bible. 167 The funding of ministerial training appears to
violate both the Court's institutional principle (ministerial schools are
"church schools") and the scholars' subject matter standard (divinity
schools are the location from which religious studies initially departed).
The Washington Supreme Court had ruled that the program violated
prong two of the Lemon test because its primary effect was to advance
religion. The United States Supreme Court reversed because the aid
was paid directly to the student and not to the institution:
Any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to
religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and
166. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 235 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
167. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1985).
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private choices of aid recipients. ... In this case, the fact that aid goes to
individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by
the individual, not by the State.1
68
On these facts, the Court found no subsidy or sponsorship of
religious institutions by the state. Three years later, in a non-school
case, the Court upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act, which granted
money for premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy services
and counseling to private institutions, including "pervasively sectarian"
169
ones.
In 1993, the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause did not
forbid an Arizona school district to provide a sign-language interpreter
for James Zobrest, a deaf student at Salpointe Roman Catholic High
School, where, the parties stipulated, "[t]he two functions of secular
education and advancement of religious values or beliefs are
inextricably intertwined. 1 70 The Ninth Circuit had found a prong two
violation of Lemon and a "symbolic union" of church and state (the
public interpreter on private school grounds) under Ball. The Court,
however, following Witters and Bowen, upheld this "neutral" program
because it was based on a private choice of schooling by the parents.
Once again, the Court found no subsidy to religious institutions in these
circumstances.
A dissenting Justice Blackmun observed that Salpointe is a
"pervasively religious" institution where "[r]eligion is a required
subject" and where an "interpreter would be required to communicate
the material covered in religion class, [and] the nominally secular
168. Id. at 480.
169. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); William D. Anderson, Jr.,
Religious Groups in the Educational Marketplace: Applying the Establishment Clause
to School Privatization Programs, 82 GEO. L.J. 1869, 1874 (1994).
But if a more rigorous standard once did exist for education, a recent case may
have obliterated it. In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court upheld a statute that
allowed-even encouraged-religious organizations to participate as grantees in
programs directed at educating and counseling adolescents in reproductive matters.
That religiously affiliated institutions were receiving state money to educate
adolescents alone was not sufficient to invalidate the program, because its
governing statute appeared to be neutral on its face and did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion. Instead of focusing on the service being provided
(education) or on the type of groups receiving grants (religious), the Court's
Establishment Clause analysis looked to the manner in which the group delivered
the government funded service.
Id.
170. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1993).
HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 47 2000
[Vol. 19:1
subjects that are taught from a religious perspective."' 17  Never before
had the Court "authorized a public employee to participate directly in
religious indoctrination. '7
Then in Agostini (the 1997 mobile instruction units case), Justice
O'Connor more directly questioned numerous aspects of the
institutional standard. Under Aguilar and Ball, public school teachers
could not enter religious schools. In overruling Aguilar, O'Connor first
disputed as unsupported by any evidence the Ball assertion that public
school teachers may be swayed by their work in the private school and
so conform to their religious environment."' To the dissenting Justice
Souter (who defends the old institutional line), she described the
weaknesses of the institutional distinction:
Taking this view, the only difference between a constitutional program and an
unconstitutional one is the location of the classroom, since the degree of
cooperation between Title I instructors and parochial school faculty is the
same no matter where the services are provided. We do not see any
perceptible (let alone dispositive) difference in the degree of symbolic union
between a student receiving remedial instruction in a classroom on his
sectarian school's campus and one receiving instruction in a van parked just at
the school's curbside. To draw this line based solely on the location of the
public employee is neither "sensible" nor "sound"....
Justice Souter defended the institutional principle in Agostini
because of a new skepticism of the subject matter standard; he resisted
the implications of his Rosenberger test. In Rosenberger, in the state
university, he could distinguish preaching from studying. In the private
school, however, he thought it difficult to distinguish religious from
secular teaching. Souter echoed the logic of Justice Douglas's
institutional argument in Lemon ("It is well known that everything
taught in most parochial schools is taught with the ultimate goal of
religious education in mind.").'75
171. Id. at 19-20. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 18 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
173. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 219 (1997) (In Ball, "a majority found a
'substantial risk' that teachers-even those who were not employed by the private
schools-might 'subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the [pervasively
sectarian] environment in which they [taught].').
174. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 227-28 (emphasis added).
175. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 635 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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Another Douglas argument from Lemon was also re-emphasized by
Souter: funding any part of the religious school (even its secular
features) is a subsidy to the religious whole. According to Douglas,
[a] history class, a literature class, or a science class in a parochial school is
not a separate institute; it is part of the organic whole which the State
subsidizes.... The school is an organism living on one budget. What the
taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science
without any trace of Vroselyting enables the school to use all of its own funds
for religious training.
According to Souter, funding remedial subjects supports the
school's entire mission. Thus remedial math is part of the general
subject of mathematics; teaching remedial math and reading is part of
the school's general obligation to teach its students. "What was so
remarkable [in Aguilar and Ball] was that the schemes in issue assumed
a teaching responsibility indistinguishable from the responsibility of the
schools themselves. '7 What is remarkable in Agostini is that Souter
(echoing Blackmun's "nominally secular" language in Zobrest) now
describes some subjects as "ostensibly secular":
There is simply no line that can be drawn between the instruction paid for at
taxpayers' expense and the instruction in any subject that is not identified as
formally religious. While it would be an obvious sham, say, to channel cash
to religious schools to be credited only against the expense of "secular"
instruction, the line between "supplemental" and general education is
likewise impossible to draw. If a State may constitutionally enter the schools
to teach in the manner in question, it must in constitutional principle be free to
assume, or assume payment for, the entire cost of instruction provided in any
ostensibly secular subject in any religious school.... [T]here was no stopping
place in principle once the public teacher entered the religious schools to
teach their secular subjects.1
7
1
Subject matter distinctions work in the public but not the private
school setting. Under Souter's Agostini standard, no course of any
variety, let alone the religion course, may receive funding in the private
school.
Note that Justice O'Connor, who challenged the institutional
standard in Agostini, wrote a separate concurrence in Rosenberger.
Perhaps she realized that the Court should not erase both institutional
176. Id. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring).
177. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 245 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
HeinOnline  -- 19 QLR 49 2000
[Vol. 19:1
and subject matter lines; she insisted that the Court must draw some
line.
When two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither can provide
the definitive answer. Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing.
Resolution instead depends on the hard task of judging-sifting through the
details and determining whether the challenged program offends the
Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires courts to draw lines,
sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each case.179
Our own prepossessions?
80
While Souter defends the institutional principle and Justice
Kennedy appears to erase all lines, O'Connor's favorite test is
"endorsement." "This test asks whether a reasonable observer would
perceive or interpret government sponsorship of private religious speech
as, in effect, the government speaking, and sending a message of
inclusion to co-religionists and exclusion to non-adherents."'' 81 In the
university setting, the endorsement test likely reverts to the status of the
faculty. Do faculty in religion departments at state universities speak
for the government so that through their speech they "send[] a message
of inclusion to co-religionists and exclusion to non-adherents"?' 82
Religion professors who look to the Court for guidance confront a
new constitutional standard in the 1990s. Without the subject matter
standard and the institutional principle, the most important remaining
legal question for religion professors may be whether they speak for the
government.
V. WHAT SHOULD RELIGION PROFESSORS TEACH?
A. The Legal Standard
We return to our hypothetical Professors One through Four. Does
the First Amendment permit them to teach at a state university in 2000?
The answer is not easy. The professor of religion presents a hard case,
179. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995)
(emphasis added).
180. See John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 23 (1949); see also McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
181. Sullivan, supra note 158, at 252.
182. Id.
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because he stands at the intersection of the Speech and Religion clauses
of the First Amendment.
As we have seen, in Rosenberger the Supreme Court ruled that the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment requires the University of
Virginia to fund Wide Awake. The Court concluded that once the state
creates a public forum, the First Amendment prohibits it from viewpoint
discrimination. The majority opinion stated that in these circumstances
religion is a viewpoint, not only a subject matter. '83 The Free Speech
Clause prohibits the state from discriminating on the basis of viewpoint
in the forum it has created.
Is a university religion department a public forum for First
Amendment purposes?'84
Under Rosenberger, if the University does not exclude religion as a
subject matter, it may not discriminate against religious editorial
viewpoints.1 5 Under Schempp, public schools may offer the subject of
religion as part of their curriculum. 8 6 A state university funds religion
as a subject matter in a department of religion. After Rosenberger, we
may ask if the department of religion is like a student activity fund. A
broad reading of Rosenberger suggests that the state violates the free
speech rights of the individual professor if it prevents him from
expressing a religious viewpoint in his classes. Thus Rosenberger can
be used to support a faculty zoo of professors who proclaim their faith, a
faculty of Professor Three's visitors, a faculty that includes Professors
One through Four.
However, the First Amendment also requires that one examine
"who is speaking.''. Government speech is not the same as private
speech; the "University's own favored message" is different from "the
private speech of students.' '8 8 When Professor Michael McConnell
represented Ronald Rosenberger in oral argument before the Supreme
Court, he noted that "even within the context of a State university, the
State university is in some cases speaking itself, and in other cases it is
183. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but
it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which
a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.").
184. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (1 1th Cir. 1991) ("We disagree
with the district court's conclusion that a university classroom is an open forum during
instructional time.").
185. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
186. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
187. Sullivan, supra note 158, at 251.
188. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
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providing a platform or a means for private speakers to be able to speak
their own minds."'' 9 Kathleen Sullivan also identifies the important
First Amendment distinction between "when government speaks" and
"when it serves as a conduit for the speech of others." ' 90 In
Rosenberger, when the university funded student publications it was
providing a conduit or platform for the (private) speech of students. The
government itself was not speaking. As the Court stated: "The program
respects the critical difference 'between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect.' "9
Is the religious studies department in the state university
government speech or the conduit or platform for the private speech of
individual professors? There are enough differences between Wide
Awake and the University of Virginia Department of Religious Studies
to suggest that in the religion department the government speaks. One
is student speech; the other is faculty speech. When the Court has
permitted religious speech in universities, it has been for student-run,
extracurricular activities, not for faculty speech in the curriculum.
Student and faculty speech are different in the appearance that they give
of state endorsement of their message. In the student cases, the Court
has emphasized that no one believes that the state or the university
speaks through its students. In Widmar,'g the Court stated that "an open
forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices."' 93  Thus there was no
appearance of sponsorship of religion by the University of Missouri.' 94
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia required the student journals
to include a written disclaimer that the organizations did not speak for
the university.' 9
The distance of faculty speech from government speech is not as
apparent. Faculty who are hired and paid by the university, who speak
189. Transcript of Petitioners' Oral Argument at 20, Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), reprinted in Sullivan, supra note 158, at
255 n.58 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
191. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 250 (1990)).
192. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
193. Id. at 274.
194. See id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 849.
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in the state classroom, as part of the university's official curriculum,
give more appearance of government sponsorship than students
involved in associations outside the classroom. Numerous First
Amendment cases have recognized that "[plublic education ... is a
form of government speech in which government is exercising a
massive degree of content control."'6 Government speech in public
education is limited by the requirements of the Establishment Clause.
The Court has held that religious instruction may not be offered in the
public schools 97 and has stated that the "force of the public school"' 98
must not be used to promote religious teaching.
However, there are also persuasive arguments that the university
professor does not speak for the government. Many of the cases that
identify the government as speaker in the public schools involve the
elementary and secondary school curricula. Different rules may apply
to the university professor, because the Court has frequently
distinguished university from elementary and secondary school
education. In Tilton, the Court stated that "by their very nature, college
and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for sectarian
influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines."' In Roemer, the
Court concluded that "[c]ollege students are less susceptible to religious
indoctrination; college courses tend to entail an internal discipline that
inherently limits the opportunities for sectarian influence; and a high
degree of academic freedom tends to prevail at the college level. ' 2°
Both Tilton and Roemer permitted funding for Catholic schools,
where the Court has often assumed that students are indoctrinated into
the teachings of the church. If students in religious colleges and
universities are able to avoid indoctrination, then state professors appear
unlikely to coerce belief in a manner that triggers the Establishment
Clause. College students can presumably distinguish their professors
from the state government and from the university administration.
Moreover, an individual professor can easily present disclaimers.
Perhaps the university professor does not really speak for the
government.
The professor's expression of religious viewpoints in the classroom
may also find some support in the First Amendment significance of
196. Sullivan, supra note 158, at 255.
197. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
198. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
199. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
200. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750 (1976).
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academic freedom. "Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment."' ' One of the reasons that nonpublic
colleges and universities received funding in Tilton and Roemer was
that the schools "subscribe[d] to a well-established set of principles of
academic freedom." 202 The Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment protects professors' academic freedom. In Epperson v.
Arkansas, 3 the Court noted that the teacher had a right "to engage in
any of the common occupations of life" and recognized the "freedom of
teachers to teach." 2" The Court has also stated that decisions about
curricula and faculty are to be made by universities and not by courts.
When it struck down the University of Missouri ban on student religious
worship in Widmar, the Court did not "question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate
scarce resources or 'to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.' 2 ' These are the "four essential freedoms" of the
206university. In his concurrence in Widmar, Justice Stevens emphasized
that university curricular as well as extracurricular decisions are better
207made by academicians than by judges. We have seen that Justice
Jackson doubted the ability of the courts to decide educational
questions.
Thus "[i]t is much too late to argue that the State may impose upon
the teachers in its schools any conditions that it chooses, however
restrictive they may be of constitutional guarantees., 20 ' However, in the
201. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
202. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
203. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
204. Id. at 105.
205. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
206. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
207. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-79.
208. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 605-06 (1967)). But see Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school children takes with
him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach sociological, economic,
political, or religious subjects that the school's managers do not want
discussed.... I question whether it is absolutely certain, as the Court's opinion
indicates, that 'academic freedom' permits a teacher to breach his contractual
agreement to teach only the subjects designated by the school authorities who hired
him.
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area of religion, it is much too early to tell how much academic freedom
the First Amendment protects.
The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple proposition
stands explicit or implicit in numerous judicial opinions, often proclaimed in
fervid rhetoric. Attempts to understand the scope and foundation of a
constitutional guarantee of academic freedom, however, generally result in
paradox or confusion. The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are inconclusive, the
promise of their rhetoric reproached by the ambiguous realities of academic
life. The problems are fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of
what academic freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it.
Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law, picking
• . 209
up decisions as a hull does barnacles.
If in general academic freedom's range is untested or unknown,
then its place in the contested area of religion is even more uncertain.1 °
We have identified some of the constitutional concerns
surrounding a Department of Religion in 2000: The professors' classes
look unconstitutional because the government is speaking; the
department is not a public forum; and the speakers are faculty and not
students. On the other hand, the university setting is not coercive to
students; students can distinguish government from faculty speech; the
professors possess First Amendment academic freedom; and
Rosenberger can be read quite broadly to protect all the professors from
discrimination against their religious viewpoints.
These considerations do not exhaust the available constitutional
standards. Sometimes the Court decides Establishment Clause cases
according to the Lemon test. T ' The Lemon case involved aid to
nonpublic schools; its test is better suited to hypotheticals set in private
rather than public schools. The Court did not apply Lemon in
Rosenberger, but did use it to uphold New York aid to religious schools
in Agostini.212 "Under the Lemon test, the government violates the
establishment clause if the government's primary purpose is to advance
religion, or if the principal effect is to aid or inhibit religion, or if there




209. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern Of The First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 252-53 (1989).
210. See generally Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 1997).
211. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
212. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
213. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 111, at 969; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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Under Lemon, the Court could easily rule that state aid to private
university religion departments violates all three prongs. The test is
harder to apply to the religion department in the state university.
Indeed, it is not clear how the Court itself applies the test. As the
petitioners' (victorious) lawyers in Agostini argued:
The fact is that although the three-part Lemon test has not been formally
repudiated by the Court as a whole, it appears to have been abandoned-at
least as a unitary test for determining Establishment Clause violations. Cases
that might have been decided through application of the test have instead been
214decided based on notions of neutrality, endorsement, or coercion.
Erwin Chemerinsky offers a similar summary of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence:
There are three major competing approaches to the establishment clause [strict
separation, neutrality theory, accommodation]. Each has adherents on the
Court and each is supported by a body of scholarly literature. The theory
chosen determines the approach used and often the result.
21 5
On a very strict theory of separation, any government funding of
religion, including religion departments, is prohibited. Even Professor
Two might not receive funding because he teaches religion! Professor
Two and the department with Professor Three's visitors might pass the
neutrality test, if all religions are equally represented. However,
monitoring the zoo's neutrality might unduly entangle the government
with religion. If the neutrality standard instead applies to the individual
professor, the zoo is unconstitutional, as are the courses of Professors
One and Four, for individual professors are probably endorsing or
advocating one religion. Yet funding religion departments is a good
accommodation of religion; moreover the court's view of university
214. Petitioners' Brief for a Writ of Certiorari, Agostini v. Felton (No. 96-552), see
also Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, On Writ
of Certiorari, Agostini v. Felton (No. 96-552).
Instead of applying the Lemon analysis in cases raising the Establishment Clause,
this Court has instead asked whether the governmental action is neutral towards
religion, whether the government's action coerces anyone to support or participate
in a religious exercise, or whether the government's action could be viewed as an
endorsement of a particular religious belief or message.
Id.
215. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 111, at 977.
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students suggests that the professor of religion is not coercive. "The
theory chosen determines the approach used and often the result.216
The cases' focus on the government's speech and funding is
familiar to, even adequate for, constitutional scholars, who are
accustomed to analyzing questions of state action and public and private
21institutions. '7 Yet it is an oddity to religion professors. From their
perspective, such a standard assigns undue emphasis to the
public/private distinction, a distinction, as we have seen, that has not
been significant to the development of the academic study of religion.
The academic discussions crossed institutional lines. Many religious
studies scholars think that they have achieved neutrality by rejecting
theology. Endorsement may be meaningless in the actual setting of the
religion department, where it may not occur to faculty that they speak
for the government. Whither academic freedom (and academic
judgment about disciplines) if the most important question left within
the academic study of religion after Rosenberger and Agostini is
whether faculty speak for the government? If the Court's focus is on
government speech, in 2000 the religion professors may prefer an
academic to a constitutional standard.
B. The Academic Standard
As we have seen, the religion professors resolved these dilemmas
in the 1960s by deciding that the Establishment Clause forbids the
teaching of theology in state departments of religion. They concluded
that Professors One and Four may not teach in state universities and that
a zoo composed of the believing visitors is also unconstitutional. They
were wrong about Professor Four. Schempp never barred theology from
state universities.
In 1976, in his report on university divinity schools, Yale professor
George Lindbeck provided a typology of theology and religious studies
that identified "four enterprises" for the student of religion.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. But see Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a
Constitutional Difference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 43-44 (1991).
[T]he federal Constitution does not impose different constraints on public and
private schools.... [T]he distinction between public and private schools that is
part of the standard conceptual apparatus of constitutional lawyers turns out to be
substantially thinner than many would find comfortable.
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First, religion may be approached either particularistically or generically:
primary attention can be given either to religions in their specificity, or to
features common to all religions. Second, one can pursue each of these
approaches in either a theological or a religious-studies mode.
"Theology," ... is concerned with the transmission and development of
religious outlooks, while "religious studies" refers to nontheological
218descriptive and explanatory investigations.
In this classification, the two types of religious studies (particular
and generic) present no constitutional problems; both are "descriptive"
and "explanatory" and constitute the classic teaching about religion.1 9
One may offer a religious studies course on, e.g., Christianity or the
phenomenology of religion. Professor Two combines both religious
studies features in his course. He describes particular religious
traditions and then seeks features common to all religions-both in the
religious studies mode. We can interpret Professor Three in the same
way, if he uses his visitors to give descriptions of particular religious
traditions and then tries to understand the generic phenomenon of
218. GEORGE LINDBECK, UNIVERSITY DivrNrv SCHOOLS: A REPORT ON
ECCLESIASTICALLY INDEPENDENT THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION 1 (1976) (emphasis added);
see also THIEMANN, supra note 86, at 145.
Christian theology does not have contrasting or contrary aims; it is rather a
particular instance of religious studies' generic concern with the meaning and truth
of religion. Christian theology, the appropriate form of reflection within the
Christian religion, poses "the reflective question as to the meaning and truth of the
Christian witness as an answer to our own question of faith as human beings."
Theology and religious studies are thus bound together by their common
constitutive concern "to ask about the meaning and truth of religion" and share as
their common constitutive experience "our basic faith in the ultimate worth of
life." Both fields appeal to general criteria of meaning and truth, because both
seek to address a "universal question" of human existence. Are these deep
similarities sufficient to obliterate all distinctions between theology and religious
studies? No, answers Ogden, because the distinctive attention given by theology to
the witness of the Christian faith "is not in the least among the necessary
conditions of the possibility of the field of religious studies." The constitutive
question of Christian theology concerning the meaning and truth of the Christian
faith is among the questions properly asked by religious studies but is not that
field's constitutive question. Thus the distinction between theology and religious
studies remains.
Id. (quoting Schubert Ogden, Theology and Religious Studies: Their Difference and the
Difference It Makes, in ON THEOLOGY 102-20 (1986)).
219. See LINDBECK, supra note 218, at 1-2 ("History of religions and linguistic-
analytic philosophical theology, for example, are typically particularistic, while
phenomenological, sociological, psychological, anthropological and metaphysical
theories of religion are generally, though not always, generic in their approach.").
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religion.2" Given the suspicion of theology, however, in a religious
studies department Professor Three would have to be very careful to
show that he was not endorsing the belief of the visitors. Moreover, as a
practical matter it is easier to find readings about than representatives of
all religions.
The third category-generic theology-should not present a
constitutional problem. Lindbeck describes this third approach as
"theological work in reference to religion generically considered, that is,
without attachment to any specific heritage. This involves exploring
and developing new outlooks oriented toward human religiousness in
general." Professor Three's course may also be categorized this way-
as long as he is not attached to any one tradition. With diverse speakers,
the course has no apparent attachment to a particular tradition, even
though the subject is committed religious belief. If funding of generic
theology were barred by the Establishment Clause, then Justice
Kennedy would be correct to complain about a First Amendment that
censors too much religion. To bar generic theology from the university
might be an establishment of non-belief. Justices Jackson and Brennan
envisioned that students would learn about human religiousness.
Moreover, even the most secular religion scholar can acknowledge that
part of religion's history is committed religious belief.22' Generic
theology is an important dimension of the phenomenology of religion;
as an academic matter, the study of religion is incomplete if it is
ignored.
The legal analysis of the fourth category-particular theology-is
more difficult; it is the theology that religion scholars have typically
excluded from state universities. According to Lindbeck, it transmits
220. See Jonathan Z. Smith, Are Theological and Religious Studies Compatible?, 26
BULLETIN/CSSR 60 (Sept. 1997) ("In what I freely acknowledge to be a necessarily
imperializing move, theology is one appropriate object of study for religious studies.
From the perspective of the academic study of religion, theology is a datum, the
theologian is a native informant."); Smart, supra note 50, at 66 ("I once told a group of
mainly Barthian theologians what I thought of them; I said: 'You are wonderful
phenomena.' They were, of course, not pleased.").
221. See LINDBECK, supra note 140, at 46.
It is not the business of a nontheological theory of religion to argue for or against
the superiority of any one faith, but it does have the job, if it is to be religiously
useful, of allowing the possibility of such a superiority. It must not, in other
words, exclude the claims religions make about themselves, and it must supply
some interpretation of what these claims mean. If it cannot do this, it is at most of
interest to purely scholarly students of religion and cannot be used by theologians
and others who are religiously concerned.
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and develops particular traditions; 2 it is "intratextual interpretation of
religion., 223 Its insider's commitment to a particular tradition renders it
constitutionally suspect, even after Rosenberger and Agostini.
"Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few
absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or
government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular
religious faith. ''2U
One does not have to evangelize or indoctrinate, however, in order
to transmit and develop a religious tradition (or any intellectual
tradition). In my hypotheticals, Professor Four transmits and develops a
tradition. As the pre-eminent scholar of religious studies, Jacob
Neusner reminds us, "[t]he nature of religions is to be traditional," and
within traditions one must interpret and evaluate texts . 2 Neusner
argues that
[i]t is not merely an evasion but deliberate fraud to claim that only people
outside of a tradition, who cannot be suspected of advocacy thereof, are
capable of scholarship and therefore of truly academic teaching about said
tradition.
226
Academic teaching about theology does not have to be
indoctrination into particular religious beliefs. Neusner explains this
intellectual process as it works in the case of Judaism:
When philosophers move from the descriptive to the normative task, they do
not abandon philosophy but in a fresh way define their work within
philosophy. For they are always philosophers, but shift to philosophy in a
different mode. The historian or theologian who, through the criticism of the
222. LINDBECK, supra note 218, at 1.
223. LINDBECK, supra note 140, at 124 (emphasis added).
224. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 219 (1997) (emphasis added).
225. Neusner, supra note t, at 16.
226. Id. at 3; see also Gordon D. Kaufman, Critical Theology as a University
Discipline, in THEOLOGY AND THE UNIVERSITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN B. COBB, JR.
35, 36 (David Ray Griffin & Joseph C. Hough, Jr. eds., 1991).
[C]ritical theology does have important contributions to make to university studies;
that critical theology should, therefore, be recognized as a legitimate discipline
even in entirely secular institutions; and that it would be desirable for persons
practicing this discipline to be appointed to full-time positions in departments of
religious studies or even in independent departments of theology. It is important
for Christian (and other) theologians to address themselves more self-consciously
than has often been the case in the past to the cultivation and development of the
critical potential of theological symbols and modes of reflection.
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thought of important figures out of the past, undertakes to give expression to
an autonomous and fresh theological position, remains in the same continuum
of theological study, but at a different point on that continuum. That historian
of theology expresses an educated judgment not about but within theology.
The same perspective, the same informed, experienced intellect prevails. And
so too, when a scholar in the academic study of religion moves from the
descriptive to the interpretive task, and when, further, that scholar presents
interpretation as a legitimate position within the religion under discussion, that
'doing of religion' remains a dimension of the study of religion. The reason,
as in the case of philosophy and theology, is that the method and the intellect
remain constant, while the purpose and frame of discourse shift. The method
of the study of religion yields descriptive results, but it also produces ideas
relevant to the life of the faith or tradition that is studied. When, therefore, a
scholar who studies about religion takes the step beyond the study, that
scholar remains a person of learning, critical judgment, and substantial
intellectual experiences and attainment: a scholar. So we may invert the
received program, faith seeking understanding, to a contemporary plan:
understanding seeking faith. 7
Neusner's argument erodes the academic claim that religion
professors must not be insiders, committed or normative. Neusner is
consistent with Lindbeck and Welch: in theological faculties "there are
not creedal or religious tests for ... faculty or students.,, 22' The true test
227. Jacob Neusner, Understanding Seeking Faith: The Case of Judaism, 71
SOUNDINGs 329, 329 (1988) (emphasis added); see also Kaufman, supra note 226.
Theology, as "faith seeking understanding," may be seen as an inquiry into the role
of faith-commitments in human existence, an inquiry into the significance of
believing (or "faithing") in human life. In this reading, "faith" is taken in a generic
sense (rather than the particular sense just mentioned), as pointing to fundamental
features of human existence: that men and women live out of and on the basis of
their trust in and loyalty to what they take to be most meaningful, precious, and
important in life; that human lives are always oriented by some (perhaps implicit)
"center of value".., and that it is out of underlying faith-commitments such as
these that humans act and live in face of the unknown future into which they must
inexorably move.
Id.
228. LINDBECK, supra note 218, at 6-7. This academic test was one of the three
features of theology that Lindbeck argued make it an appropriate subject for state
universities. First is its affirmation of freedom.
To most theological educators [freedom] is a sine qua non of the intellectually
responsible transmission of a religious tradition, and thus part of the essence of
what they mean by theological education. This insistence on the autonomy of the
scholarly study of religion explains why it was largely within university
theological faculties that religious studies as we now know them first developed
and still continue to prosper.
Second was the academic requirement. Lindbeck's third point was that universities may
"sponsor theological education in as many religious traditions as they wish."
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is not ecclesial, but academic, i.e., the quality of scholarship.229 Yet the
academic standard does not proscribe creedal commitment. Creedal
commitment is not a requirement for scholarship, but it need not prevent
good scholarship within a tradition.
Lindbeck also commented that universities may "sponsor
theological education in as many religious traditions as they wish." He
concluded that "even public universities can legitimately participate in
theological education without violating the principle that no religion
should be given legally preferential treatment., 230 Lindbeck's academic
statement is an important constitutional point: a state university
department of religion may not favor one theology over another. "There
should be, e.g., ... no discrimination against students on religious
grounds; no religious conditions on employment or student status; no
compulsory religious services or courses; and equality of opportunity
(i.e., all religions should be taught).23 '
229. McLean and Kimber's study of state universities had captured the dilemma of
creedal commitment by theologians; see McLean & Kimber, supra note 62, at 5.
The Achille's [sic] heel of this approach [is] in the phrase "without regard for
creedal commitment." Can religion be so taught? The answer is a "yes" and a
"no." Competent scholars can and do teach the history and dogma of various
religious traditions from a relatively objective perspective, just as various
philosophical, political or psychological systems and traditions are or may be so
taught... . Those, however, who hold that at present these conditions cannot be
met believe that the answer lies in other approaches.
Id.
230. LINDBECK, supra note 218, at 8.
231. Kauper, supra note 67, at 92 (emphasis added).
The teaching of religion in state universities is constitutional as long as it meets
certain conditions. There should be, e.g., no discrimination against students on
religious grounds; no religious conditions on employment or student status; no
compulsory religious services or courses; and equality of opportunity (i.e., all
religions should be taught). [Moreover,] the distinction should be observed
between the teaching of religion to promote knowledge and understanding and that
type aimed deliberately at indoctrination and commitment to religious faith. The
teaching of religious ideas in an objective and fair way is appropriately a state
university function. To win converts and seek commitment is outside its function
and violates the separation principle.
Id.
While the major religious traditions generally receive adequate treatment in the
curricula of Departments of Religion, it should be noted that this is not always true
of the minority faiths. Though overt prejudice is rarely the cause, the lesser sects
do run the risk of having their viewpoint overlooked or minimized or distorted by
inexpert or unsympathetic instructors.
GORDIS ET AL., supra note 134, at 29.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The religion scholars drew the constitutional/academic line in the
wrong place when they excluded Professor Four from the academy
because of his normative arguments within a tradition. What about
Professor One and the individual professors in the zoo? Neusner once
again is instructive when he contrasts the intellectual environment of the
classroom with religious practice:
We do not pray in classrooms. We do not advocate that students adopt belief
in God, let alone specific theological positions. Our lectern is not confused
with a pulpit. We do not preach. We teach. We do not teach religion,
moreover, but we teach about religion, a distinction absolutely fundamental to
our work....
The academic world is made of words, not supernatural experience. We
do not sing, we do not pray, we do not meditate, we do not repeat sacred
formulas, we do not fast, bum incense, dance or otherwise move or control our
bodies and attain visions. All we do is talk and think. 232
Professor One advocates belief in God when he urges the students
to conclude that Jesus Christ is our Lord and Savior. Professor Three
will probably have a mix of advocates and non-advocates when he
232. Neusner, supra note t, at 2, 5 (emphasis added); see also Schubert M. Ogden,
Theology in the University: The Question of Integrity, in THEOLOGY AND THE
UNIVERsrrY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN B. COBB, JR. 67, 78 (David Ray Griffin &
Joseph C. Hough, Jr. eds., 1991).
My contention is that when Christian theology is understood and practiced as it
should be, it is not just another form of bearing Christian witness, which is rightly
subject to the teaching office of the church, but, rather, a distinctive form of
essentially the same process of critical reflection embodied in one way or another
in all the other academic fields and disciplines.
Id.
Religion is an objective study. "[S]uch study is not carried on for the purposes
of evangelism: it is not aimed at persuading students to adopt any religious or ethical
position or posture nor is it intended to 'nourish faith."' Welch, supra note 76, at 9-11.
Professors are not "intended to encourage religion or to cultivate morals." Id. The
study of religion "must not be defined as the care of souls or as catechetical instruction
in the faith." Id. The student does not learn faith in the curriculum; "the task is not one
of reduplicating in the learner a religious experience or of transmitting an esoteric
understanding or truth available only to the 'insider."' Id.
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chooses believers who proclaim their faith; so too, for a departmental
233
zoo.
From the earliest days of Religionswissenschaft, the fundamental
professional commitment of the religion professors has been to
distinguish their academic enterprise from religious practice, core
religious activities, and evangelism. The turmoil about the identity of
religious studies has focused on the Professor Four-style theologians in
the academy. Some religious studies professors excluded Professor
Four because they confused his normative arguments about a tradition
with proselyting. The religion professors may continue to agree about
Professor One; his enterprise is not academic and so remains a
questionable enterprise in the university setting. Professor Four
instructs but Professor One proselytizes. Under a revised academic
standard, the professors may continue to distinguish between the
scholar's study and the evangelist's mission station, the seminar room
and the pulpit, teaching and preaching, i.e., between religious
studies/theology and evangelism.
34
What would happen if the academic standard became the
constitutional standard? In the professors' view, the First Amendment
also permits distinctions between Professor Four and Professor One.
Although evangelism is a subject whose funding is prohibited by the
Establishment Clause, theology is a viewpoint protected by the Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.
23
Identifying theology as the viewpoint clarifies that Plato, Sartre et
al. would not have been silenced by the University of Virginia
regulation. Once teachers begin to evangelize, the Establishment Clause
233. See Robert R. Hann, Commitment, Theology, and the Dilemma of Religious
Studies at the State University, 19/2 HoRIZONs 263, 270 (1992).
"Theology" meant the received doctrines of a particular denomination, and
"Religious Studies" was catechesis, the transmission of that faith to the next
generation. Theology understood in this way was properly excluded from the
practice of modem Religious Studies: it was, as its critics knew, often intellectually
uncritical and, if attempted in a state university, it would have violated the most
elementary notions of separation between church and state.
Id.
234. See MILNER BALL, THE WoRD AND THE LAW 2 (1993) ("Instead of arguing that
theology is relevant to law, I shall do theology and either perform its relevance or fail to
do so. I am clearly eager to engage others in conversation about these matters, but,
equally clearly, I do not intend to proselytize or give religious instruction.").
235. See Hann, supra note 233, at 270 (writing of "an understanding of theology as
the articulation of a comprehensive worldview, a worldview with no rights over other
worldviews, but one which claims for itself the same rights which other worldviews and
their adherents enjoy in the university.").
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should prohibit the state from subsidizing their speech. Theological and
philosophical viewpoints, however, are protected speech under the First
Amendment. The Marxist may select Mao or Lenin; the philosopher
may reflect on the continuity of Rawls (or Kierkegaard) with Kant; the
236theologian may prefer Barth to Rahner or Pelagius to Augustine.
Viewpoint discrimination occurs when one censors the theologian;
Establishment Clause violations arise when the state funds the
evangelist.
"To what extent, and at what points in the curriculum, religious
materials should be cited are matters which the courts ought to entrust
very largely to the experienced officials who superintend our Nation's
public schools. They are experts in such matters, and we are not.,
23 7
The religion experts know that in the 1990s, the institutional location
does not determine the content of the instruction. Their professional
expertise is to distinguish between proselyting and imparting
knowledge. Accordingly, scholars in religion would be wise this time to
ignore the Court's Rosenberger dicta, and to demonstrate that, along
with Justice Souter and Professor Smith, "in the scholar's study" they
remain capable of distinguishing between "religious speech" and
''speech about religion."
236. See RONALD M. GREEN, KIERKEGAARD AND KANT: THE HIDDEN DEBT (1992);
see also Delwin Brown, Academic Theology and Religious Studies, 26 BULLETIN/CSSR
64, 65 (Sept. 1997).
I mean that the humanities and the social sciences in the academy are replete with
investigations and evaluations of particular communal beliefs and practices that are
fundamentally analogous to what I have called academic theology. To illustrate I
could point to the work of a political scientist examining the claims of the Black
Panthers, or an historian examining the impact of cultural pluralism on the idea of
America. Both examine ideas in context, both trace the relationship of the ideas to
other discursive and non-discursive features of the context, both may facilitate the
assessment of those rooted ideas in terms of any number of norms both internal
and external to the community, and both allow their interpretations and
assessments to be examined and criticized not only within the community they are
studying but also, and most especially, within their own scholarly community.
Id.
Christian theology is basically a denominational and community activity: it is not a
secular activity. It is imperfectly scholarship. Its analogues are Marxist
philosophy in Moscow in the old days, some ideological philosophy (in fact most
Western philosophy, notably analytic philosophy, expounding a version of
scientific humanism), Islamic theology, Black studies, and Chicano studies (within
them, often not well displayed, a political core. Religious Studies, in principle, is
impartial and given to informed empathy.)
Smart, supra note 50, at 67.
237. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 300 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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